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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three studies of the relationship between neighborhoods, housing
policy, and local public schools. In the first chapter I analyze mortgage loans and home values from 2000-2014 to study housing markets in neighborhoods near racially diverse schools.
Using a national sample of over 3,600 middle schools, I construct a measure of school demographic diversity and estimate how home values and mortgage loan amounts change as
diversity increases. For identification I isolate variation in school demographics associated
with the quasi-random timing of rental housing development under the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit (LIHTC) program.
I find that mortgage amounts rise by nearly 6.7%, holding median home values constant
and controlling for changes in local income levels and home buyer socioeconomic characteristics. The magnitude of the effect is consistent for white, black, and Hispanic home buyers,
and coincides with a decrease in home values of 2.5% near diversifying schools. The effect is
reversed for white home buyers near diverse schools in low-income areas, who borrow less for
housing holding home values constant. I present two explanations for these findings, both
which shed light on neighborhood wealth, down payment ability, and the consequences of
household sorting over local amenities.
The second chapter is a joint work with Pat Bayer and Peter Blair. We estimate how
much parents value school expenditure and their willingness to finance it through higher
taxes. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in expenditures and taxes from school finance
reforms, we find that a 1 percent increase in taxes to fund education increases house prices
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by an economically small and statistically insignificant 0.06 percent. We find larger price
changes in regions with less elastic housing supply. Our results provide support the core
prediction of Tiebout (1956) that decentralized jurisdictions can efficiently provide local
public goods such as education.
The third chapter is a descriptive study of a key provision of the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit Program that reserves certain rental units for families with children. I show
that this type of development in particular has an effect on schools that is statistically
distinguishable from other types of LIHTC development. I then test whether changes at
the school level induced by this provision alter the way districts allocated resources for
schooling. The preliminary results of this analysis open the door for future research using
more sophisticated inference techniques.
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Chapter 1
Local Wealth and The Market for
Homes Near Diverse Schools
1.1

Introduction

Classical theories of neighborhood choice beginning with Schelling (1971) argue that observed patterns of household sorting by race reflect a range of preferences for the racial
demographics of neighbors and other neighborhood attributes. Empirical analogues of the
Schelling model have shown preferences similar to those for neighborhood racial composition
affect the decision to enroll children in a local public school (Caetano and Maheshri 2017).
In this paper I study how household preferences for school characteristics affect the market
for homes near schools that become more racially diverse.
Schools and other neighborhood features that affect the demand for housing in an area
are commonly referred to as local amenities (Baum-Snow and Ferreira 2015). Changes to
amenities affect home values as households trade-off neighborhood attributes and physical
housing characteristics when choosing where to live. Down payments and closing costs,
however, are a fraction of the home value and impose a threshold of wealth necessary to
purchase a home. Thus a home buyer may have preferences for certain physical housing
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and neighborhood features, but market demand and household wealth both play a role in
shaping the location choice of home buyers.
Given that the remaining balance owed on a home (net of up-front payments) is typically
paid over the course of a 30-year home mortgage, variation in mortgage amounts can be
informative about the wealth of home buyers across a geographical space like school zones.
A central assumption is that mortgage values are a function of the underlying house price
less the lump sum down payment. I estimate the relationship between exogenous changes to
school racial diversity and mortgage values holding house prices constant, to understand how
preferences over public school characteristics affect local neighborhood wealth via changes
in the down payment ability of home buyers.
I employ a national panel of over 3,600 schools from 2000-2014, using middle school
attendance zones as geographic boundaries when calculating aggregate mortgage amounts
and home prices. I measure school diversity by the extent to which the school student
body is comprised of one race or spread equally across five observable groups.1 The initial
distribution of the diversity index across schools in 2000 is bimodal, with a mass of low
diversity schools and another mass comprised of high diversity schools. To motivate my
analysis, I document that schools on average become more racially diverse from 2000-2014.
Estimating the causal effect of school diversity on housing markets requires disentangling
the relationship between racial demographics and neighborhood attributes unobserved in
the data but correlated with home values. In their seminal paper, Bayer et al. (2007)
show that cross-sectional differences in home values that appear associated with race are
largely a product of the relative quality of other amenities offered in minority versus white
neighborhoods. My empirical design is a two-stage least squares model that exploits the
panel nature of the data to relate plausibly exogenous changes in school diversity to changes
in mortgage values and local home prices.
1I

compute a scaled version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that measures market concentration. My
measure can take on values between zero and ten, with ten being a school with equal shares of all race types.
Further discussion of the school and neighborhood diversity index is in section 1.2
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I first classify each school as low or high diversity by estimating a finite mixture model,
commonly used in urban economics to identify housing submarkets based on observable
neighborhood characteristics (Ugarte et al. 2004, Belasco et al. 2012). My identifying assumption is that the bimodal distribution of schools by diversity in the year 2000 reflects two
latent school types. I then exploit differences in the timing of rental housing development
under the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program using an event-study model
to identify quasi-random shifts in student enrollment counts by race and ethnic group. I
plot the event-time coefficients as visual evidence that LIHTC-induced changes to white and
Hispanic enrollment vary by neighborhood diversity type. I find little evidence of changes in
black and Asian enrollment relative to the year LIHTC units become available. The modelpredicted enrollment counts are used to calculate exogenous enrollment growth of students
from each race and ethnic group.
To construct a shift-share instrument for my preferred two-stage least squares model,
the predicted enrollment growth rates from the LIHTC event-study are applied to the observed school enrollment shares for each race and ethnic group in the year 2000. I use the
resulting exogenous enrollment shares to recalculate the diversity measure for each school
by year observation. The reconstructed diversity levels serve as instruments for changes in
the observed levels of school diversity. This approach borrows from Boustan (2010) and
Derenoncourt (2018) who study various outcomes of demographic shifts during the Great
Northern Migration of black households from 1940-1970. In my main model I estimate the
effect of school diversity on mortgage values, holding home values constant and conditioning
on school zone and year fixed effects.
I find that the median value of newly originated mortgage loans within an attendance
zone rises as schools become more diverse, holding median home values constant and controlling for other school and borrower characteristics that could also explain loan amounts.
My results show that a one standard deviation diversity increase raises mortgage values be-
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tween 4.8% and 6.7%.2 This main result is consistent for white, black and Hispanic home
buyers. Alternatively, I find that median mortgage values for white home buyers decrease
near diversifying schools in low-income areas, holding home values and all other observable
factors constant.
I compute an aggregate index of mortgage loan values for home purchases within a school
attendance zone from 2000-2014, using transactions data provided under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). My second financial measure is a constant-quality house price index
provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and aggregated to the school zone level.
The two measures approximate school zone level variation in mortgage loan amounts and
home values relative to the base year of 2000. When paired with school zone fixed effects
in my main regressions, my estimates capture the covariation between school diversity and
mortgage values within a school zone over time, conditional on home value appreciation used
as a control.
Holding home values constant is necessary to control for potential spillovers from LIHTC
affecting mortgage values through omitted channels correlated with changes in school diversity. In an exhaustive analysis of the neighborhood effects of LIHTC, Diamond and McQuade
(2019) show that house prices are predicted to rise in low-income areas following LIHTC as
a signal neighborhood quality improvements. Alternatively, prices will fall in high-income
areas once LIHTC development is introduced. Studies have also shown that LIHTC development is associated with decreases in violent crimes in low-income areas (Freedman and
Owens 2011), and has the largest effect on property values in gentrifying areas (Baum-Snow
and Marion 2009). For completeness I test for the effect of school diversity on my home
value measure directly. The results of this exercise suggest that home values fall when local
schools become more diverse following LIHTC.
I consider two potential explanations for rising mortgage values occurring simultaneously
with falling home values. It is possible that as schools become more diverse, new home
2 Recall

that the diversity measure takes values from 0-10. A one standard deviation increase in diversity
is about 2.4, compared to a mean diversity level of 4.64 in 2000 and 5.96 in 2014.
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buyers select a higher quantity of housing as compared to the quantity of housing measured by the house price index, which approximates price changes of physically comparable
homes over time. This implies that rising mortgage values are associated with higher wealth
households moving into neighborhoods near diversifying schools and purchases larger/higher
quality homes. An alternative explanation is decreased demand for housing near diversifying
schools reduces home values as those households with preferences against diverse schools exit.
Boustan (2010) argues that this behavior contributed to increases in urban black home ownership from 1950-1980, when home values in the central city decreased as white households
moved to suburban areas. In my case mortgage values are rising as lower wealth households
sort into neighborhoods near diverse schools and buy homes at lower values, but borrow
more in terms of real mortgage amounts as wealth constrains down payment ability.
Neighborhood schools are a unique amenity as households may sort over student demographic characteristics directly, or use those demographics as a weak signal of school quality.
I create an environment where school demographic changes arise from a housing shock where
the timing is independent of initial levels of school quality. The subsequent sorting behavior
is important to understand if changes to neighborhood wealth emerge as a result. These results have implications that link housing and education policy given the connection between
neighborhood wealth and the provision of public goods and quality schools.

1.2

Race and The Economics of Neighborhood Choice

Economic models of neighborhood choice feature households with preferences over characteristics of the individual housing unit (square footage, age, number of bedrooms and
bathrooms) and attributes of the neighborhood (density, racial composition and average education attainment of neighbors). Equilibrium patterns of segregation over race, income or
other observable attributes result from the optimization calculus of all households in a particular market (Rothenberg et al. 1991). The literature describes this sorting as a powerful
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market outcome, in theory resulting in multiple equilibrium neighborhood types. Sorting
and the stable equilibrium outcome in neighborhoods is the fundamental idea of Schelling
(1971) and more recent studies that have formalized the equilibrium sorting result.
Endogenously formed school demographic composition becomes an amenity that affects
willingness to pay for housing in the area. If a home buying household has school aged children, it follows that parents care about the formation of peer networks that affect educational
outcomes. It matters less if peers materially affect student outcomes and more that parents
have preferences for a certain type of peer. Caetano and Maheshri (2017) use data for Los
Angeles County schools and show that once the share of minority students reach a certain
level, the share of white students decreases at an accelerating rate until the school population
reaches a high minority equilibrium. Falling demand for local public school services could
coincide with decreased demand for housing in the immediate area.
Websites designed to provide home buyers with neighborhood characteristics provide
detailed information about the school composition along and link the user to sites specifically
describing school demographics.3 The proliferation of home search sites reduces the cost of
information used by households to form an opinion about the underlying racial composition of
a neighborhood when choosing where to live. If homeowners associate property tax payments
with the funding of local public schools, then preferences over school demographics will be
reflected in the demand for housing in a neighborhood regardless of the presence of school
aged children in the home.
I hypothesize that preferences over school demographics affect the demand price for
housing as a byproduct of sorting. Cutler et al. (1999) assert that white households will
pay more to live near other white households in the absence of laws upholding segregation.
Further, the correlation between race and household wealth imply that sorting over racial
attributes can lead to differences in the spatial distribution of wealth across a broader housing
market. Therefore changes in the amount borrowed ratio for home purchases in a school
3 Zillow,

Redfin, and homes.com all provide both a snapshot of school demographics and a link to
greatschools.com
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attendance zone can reflect home buyer wealth changes by capturing variation in the down
payment made for the average home purchase. If mortgage values decrease relative to prices,
I infer that larger down payments are being made as the home buyers sorting into the market
are wealthier. If mortgage values rise relative to prices, it is because home buyers with lower
wealth sort into the neighborhood and borrow more for housing after making smaller down
payments.
I test my hypothesis empirically by first constructing a measure of school and neighborhood diversity in section 1.2.1. My estimation strategy uses subsidized development under
LIHTC to create exogenous variation in the demographics of schools, as described in section 1.5. Diamond and McQuade (2019) argue that LIHTC diversifies neighborhoods along
various margins that increases home prices in low income areas and decreases prices in high
income areas. In my main model I hold price changes constant and estimate the relationship
between LIHTC induced demographic changes and mortgage values, taking the timing of
the housing development as random. I observe demographic changes in a single measure of
school diversity, constructed from the enrollment shares of different race and ethnic groups
in a school.

1.2.1

A Measure of School Racial Diversity, SDIit

My goal is to measure the extent to which the students in a neighborhood public school
are concentrated amongst one race group or diversely distributed across several. My measure is a linear transformation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is typically
used to analyze firm market concentration.4 Using a measure of concentration instead of
the fraction of black or Hispanic residents expands the potential for inference within the
empirical framework of sections 1.4 and 1.5. The school diversity index, SDIit measures the
concentration of the student population in neighborhood i across five subgroups r ∈ {white,
4 The

HHI gained popularity as a way to study the effects of mergers on the distribution of total market
share across firms (Rhoades 1993), with higher values representing higher market power for a single firm.
For interpretation I transform the measure so that neighborhoods with higher levels of diversity have higher
index values.
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Hispanic, black, Asian, and ‘other’}.
Denote srit as the percentage of group r in school i year t, such that srit ∈ [0, 100]. The
standard measure of HHI is the sum of the squared race shares, or

HHIit =

5
X

s2rit .

(1.1)

r =1

With five groups, max[HHI ] = 10, 000 if the student population is from one group, and
min[HHI ] = 2, 000 when each group comprises an equal 20% share. For interpretation I
0

compute HHIit to assign a lower value to low diversity schools,
0

HHIit = max[HHI ] − HHIit .

(1.2)

0

Now, max[HHI ] = 8, 000 if the school student population is equally distributed across
groups and 0 if all students are of one race. For ease of interpretation I scale my final
measure between 0 and 10, such that
0

HHIit
SDIit =
0 × 10.
max[HHI ]

(1.3)

When SDIit = 0 there is zero diversity (all students are from one r group) and SDIit = 10
represents equal distribution across all five r groups. In context of this paper SDIit is
representative of both the students in the school and the residents of the neighborhood. The
initial distribution of SDIit is bimodal and supporting the notion that equilibrium sorting
outcomes persist in US schools in addition to neighborhoods. I present estimates for the
distribution of SDIit and discuss my specification that relates mortgage values and home
prices to SDIit in section 1.5.
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1.2.2

School Diversity and Traditional Demographic Measures

Diversity differs in both construction and interpretation from other demographic measures
used in the population analysis, such as the dissimilarity and isolation indices. These measures are used to study segregation and racial disparities in economic outcomes for blacks and
whites. My school diversity measure is more flexible in the sense that it accommodates more
than two categories of race and ethnic type. The trade off is that neighborhoods generally
classified as low diversity can be majority white, black, Hispanic or Asian. In this section
I discuss why my measure is suitable for the analysis of this paper and how it differs from
other measures used in the neighborhood choice literature.
Neighborhood segregation within cities is the focus of many demographic studies concerned with the distribution and clustering of residents by race across a city or metropolitan
areas. The dissimilarity index measures how evenly distributed the total population of black
and white residents are spread across different spatial units in a larger geography. The isolation index measures exposure, the extent to which black residents come in contact with
white residents of a city. The two traditional measures have been used to study the effects
of segregation on income inequality (Cutler et al. 1999), and educational outcomes (Reardon
2016).
Logan and Parman (2017) provide a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the two
traditional measures. By construction, the two measures are concerned with how the population of black and white residents in a large geographical area are distributed across smaller
neighborhood units. Thus the dissimilarity and isolation indices are attractive for studies
of aggregate city level economic outcomes between two groups. The central question of this
paper is how within neighborhood demographic changes affect of housing markets and borrowing, and less about how aggregate home values in a city are related to segregation across
neighborhoods. Thus the two traditional measures are not appropriate for my analysis.
Traditional measures are also limited to the comparison of two groups, most often to
understand differences between black and white resident outcomes. My composite diversity
9

index SDIit flexibly describes population changes of several race and ethnic groups. This allows for a broader demographic analysis and combines several underlying forces that produce
sorting in a modern context. Couture and Handbury (2017) describe the urban revitalization as a process attracting white working professionals to urban areas from 2000-2010, and
Diamond (2016) analyzes neighborhood level spillovers from this influx of college-educated
workers. Epstein (2008) study the effect of existing social networks on the location choice of
Hispanic immigrants. SDIit allows me to understand how the complex residential decisions
of white, black, Hispanic, and Asian households as a whole affect home values.

1.2.3

School Demographic Data

I observe enrollment counts by race and ethnic background, and thus SDIit , for a balanced
panel of 3,661 schools from 2000-2014. This allows for rich analysis of student demographic
changes over time and without the gaps between periods encountered when using census
data. The population shares for race group r in the calculation of SDIit are the fraction of
total school enrollment belonging to each group. Summary statistics for school demographic
variables are shown in table 1.1, column 1 for the full sample. The average school in my
sample across all years is 15% black, 24% Hispanic, 6% Asian. Aud (2011) estimates the
K-12 population for the US to be 17% black, 21% Hispanic, and 5% Asian using NCES data
from the 2007-2008 school year. At the mean, my sample is roughly representative of the
average US public school.
One of the two ways I measure household income of students in the data is the fraction of
total enrollment receiving free lunch subsidies. To qualify for free lunch subsidies household
income must be less than or equal to 130% of US poverty level, and Aud (2011) estimate
48% of US students in 2008 received the subsidy. In my full sample, 40% of the students live
in households with income levels low enough to qualify for fully subsidized lunch. I include
this variable in my analysis to control for changes in the lower tail of the income distribution
within a neighborhood. I describe my other income measure, the average income of new
10

home buyers, in section 1.3.1.
The school demographic data are publicly available through NCES and include schools
with 6 grade students from the lower 48 states. Middle school attendance zones make up the
large share of these schools, and figure 3.2 shows the national distribution of middle school
zones in my data. The smaller boundaries of middle schools are conducive to neighborhood
fixed effects but reduce the power of my empirical model by decreasing the number of home
mortgage transactions mapped to a neighborhood in a given year. Larger boundaries, such
as high-schools or districts, yield richer within neighborhood variation over time but increase
the potential for measurement error when aggregating mortgages over an larger spatial area.
In the context of this paper, it is assumed that the estimated effect of school diversity is
constant across space, within the attendance zone.

1.2.4

The Distribution of Schools by Diversity Level

I estimate the underlying distribution of SDIit in figure 1.2a and 1.2b for the years 2000 and
2014, respectively. The two kernel density plots show that schools follow a bimodal distribution that supports long run equilibrium theories of racial sorting discussed in the beginning
of section 1.2. Given the empirical distribution of student demographics I categorize schools
into two groups. Schools in the left peak are low diversity and those on the right peak are
high diversity, with some in equilibrium and others in transition between the two potential
steady states. Figure 1.3 shows this sorting pattern is consistent across income groups, albeit
much weaker in high income areas.
To formalize this categorization, I hypothesize that the distribution of SDIit is a combination of the two normally distributed equilibrium types. The true type is unobserved,
but the kernel densities show the potential for two distinct latent subgroups. I estimate the
mean and standard deviation of the two latent distributions using a finite mixture model
and maximum likelihood estimation. Studies in the urban literature use mixture models
to identify housing submarkets, where observed physical characteristics of homes determine
11

groups of relatively close substitute housing units (Ugarte et al. 2004, Belasco et al. 2012).
The result of this procedure are estimates of the mean and standard deviation of each underlying distribution, along with a predicted probability of each school being of a certain
type, conditional on the observed level of diversity SDIit .
The density function f (SDI|X ) can be expressed as a linear combination of the g ∈
{low, high} diversity group densities, with group specific parameters θg ∈ {µg , σg2 }. The
data generating process is

f (SDI|X, θ ) = ρflow (SDI|θlow ) + (1 − ρ)fhigh (SDI|θhigh ),

(1.4)

where ρ is the proportion of all schools in the low diversity group. The group-specific mean,
µg , and standard deviation ,σg , of SDI can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood
function
max log L = log [ρflow (SDI|θlow ) + (1 − ρ)fhigh (SDI|θhigh )].

θlow ,θhigh

(1.5)

The mixture model has an additional benefit of recovering estimated probabilities that
each school is either high or low diversity type. Following Deb and Trivedi (2013), I use
the observed value of SDIit to estimate the posterior probability that school i is a low or
high diversity type in the year 2000. Since type is a binary outcome, the model predicts the
logit probabilities, ρi , of each school being categorized as a low diversity type. The binary
assignment rule for a school diversity type follows

LowDiversityi =





1,

if ρi ≥ 0.5




0,

otherwise.

(1.6)

School i is assigned to the low diversity group if the model predicts a greater than
50% probability that i is in the latent low diversity distribution. Otherwise the school is
characterized as high diversity. This strategy yields a roughly equal share of schools classified
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as high or low diversity (51% vs 49%, respectively).
Columns two and three of table 1.1 show that diverse schools tend to be larger, have
a larger share of Hispanic and black students, and a larger share of free lunch students.
In my main specification I also categorize schools as small or large urban, small or large
suburban, or rural to account for the underlying association between racial composition and
urban neighborhoods. In terms of geographic categorization, diverse schools are 40% urban,
27% suburban, and 33% rural; while low diversity schools are 21% urban, 22% suburban,
and 57% rural. Geographic controls are included in my main regression and account for
cross-sectional differences in mortgage values that average across market type.
To further test for heterogeneity, schools can be described as majority white, black, or
Hispanic. Of the 3,661 schools in my sample most (78%) have population that is greater
than 50% white. Roughly 7% and 8% are majority black and Hispanic, respectively. Nearly
90% of the low diversity schools are majority white, in contrast to high diversity areas where
60% of the schools are majority white, 8% are majority black, 13% are majority Hispanic,
and 19% have no clear majority group.

1.3

Empirical Strategy

There are three parts to my estimation strategy. First, I estimate the effect of higher levels of
school diversity on mortgage values and prices using a fixed effects model and observed levels
of school diversity. Next, I illustrate the exogenous effect of LIHTC on school socioeconomic
outcomes using a flexible event study design that allows for heterogeneity across school type.
I show visual evidence highlighting the average effect of new subsidized housing development
on school race and income characteristics, along with other school level inputs such as teacher
counts and total student enrollment. Lastly, I estimate the effect of increased diversity on
mortgage values by constructing a shift-share type instrument based on the growth rates of
each demographic group as predicted by the event study model. The setup of this strategy

13

follows closely from Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2018) who explore how the Great
Migration of 1940-1970 affected the residential decisions of white households, and the upward
mobility of black households, respectively.
I control for local home prices in each of my main models to sharpen my analysis in two
ways. For LIHTC to be a valid instrument for school demographic shifts, one assumption is
that LIHTC only affects mortgage values through changes in school demographics. Holding
prices constant absorbs the effects of other spillovers from LIHTC described in the literature.
It follows that variation in new mortgages associated with changes in school diversity results
from sorting based on school demographics. I also use prices to frame my estimates in
terms of the loan-to-value ratio. When mortgage values change holding median home values
constant, inference can be made about the financial standing of new home buyers in within
the attendance zone.

1.3.1

House Price and Mortgage Data

I observe the value of mortgage contracts for single family home purchases along with the
income of the home buyer from 2000-2014. Using public data available under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) that provides the census tract of the home purchase, I
map each observation to a school zone and use the aggregate median mortgage value in
a given year. The HMDA also requires lenders to report median home buyer income, the
second of two neighborhood income measures (the other is described in section 1.2.3 as the
fraction of students receiving free lunch). I weight all of my specifications by the mortgage
transaction count in the attendance zone for the year 2000.5
I measure home value appreciation using the FHFA house price index, or HPI. The HPI
measures the appreciation rate of local house prices relative to the base year 2000. HPI
is observed at the census tract level and the aggregate median is used to measure price
appreciation at the school zone level. For consistency, I compute an aggregate index of
5 The

average attendance zone has 485 mortgage transactions in the year 2000.
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mortgage loan amounts for home purchases within a school attendance zone from 2000-2014.
The two measures approximate school zone level variation in mortgage loan amounts and
home values relative to the base year of 2000. When paired with school zone fixed effects
in my main regressions, my estimates capture the covariation between school diversity and
mortgage values within a school zone over time, conditional on home value appreciation used
as a control.
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 1.1 for mortgage values and home buyer
income. Both measures are deflated to 2014-dollar values using CPI inflation factors from
Oregon State University (Sahr 2014). The median home loan in 2014 prices is $237,094 and
the median home buyer earns roughly $87,039 annually. Mortgage values near high diversity
schools are 13% higher than near low diversity schools, with essentially no difference in home
buyer incomes.
Figure 1.4 presents a binned scatter plot of the relationship between school diversity and
mortgage values in the raw data. The positive correlation between SDI and mortgage values
across all observations is likely related to the propensity of diverse schools to be in cities with
higher average mortgage values overall, not preferences for a diverse set of neighbors. The
positive correlation could also be a byproduct of diverse schools being on average located
closer to the city center, and thus systematically related to higher prices by proximity and
not preferences. In the empirical tests to follow I employ school zone and year fixed effects,
and thus estimate the effects of within school changes in diversity levels on mortgage values
across time. This eliminates spurious cross sectional variation that would bias estimated
effects of school diversity on mortgage values.

1.3.2

Fixed Effects Estimation

A naive fixed effects model relating local mortgage values to school diversity can be expressed
as
0

Mit = α1 SDIit + α2 Pit + Xit β + γi + γt + it ,
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(1.7)

where Mit is the log of the mortgage value index for school zone i year t. Pit is the log of
the FHFA house price index. Both school zone (γi ) and year (γt ) fixed effects are included
in the regression along with a Xit , a set of descriptive neighborhood covariates including the
two income measures, total enrollment counts, and teacher counts. I estimate the average
effect of diversity and test for heterogeneous effects across several school and neighborhood
types.
Estimates of α1 and α2 from equation 1.7 are presented in table 1.2. Each reported
specification includes school zone and year fixed effects. Across specifications I vary the
inclusion of the income and home buyer demographic measures, to test how the relationship
between diversity levels and mortgage values is explained by changes in the composition of
home buyers. Comparing the results of the fixed effects models, the effects of diversity in
table 1.2 are small and imprecisely estimated.
The empirical predictions of Bayer et al. (2007) appear to hold similarly in the fixed effects
estimation of table 1.2. When fixed effects are included, neighborhood quality attributes
associated with racial demographics are held constant, and the effect of school diversity is
nil. Eliminating cross sectional differences between school diversity and mortgage values
is an advantage of fixed effects estimation but without exogenous, time varying changes to
school demographics the model lacks identifying power.

1.4

LIHTC Development as Exogenous Shocks to SDIit

Created as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and managed by the Internal Revenue
Service, the goal of the LIHTC program is to increase the supply of rental housing in the US.
Federal tax credits are allocated to state and municipal housing authorities that distribute
the credits to developers in a competitive application process. The Internal Revenue Service
requires these agencies to release annually a detailed plan of how developer applications for
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LIHTC funding are scored and ranked for approval. Developers of approved projects sell the
credits to passive investors in exchange for operational cash flow at an estimated 75 cents for
every dollar of tax credit, and investor tax benefits are realized over a ten-year period post
investment (Eriksen 2009). The location of LIHTC development during my sample period
is shown in figure 1.5.
Program guidelines require either 20% of tenants earn less than 50% of the metro area
median income or at least 40% of tenants earn less than 60% area median income. Although
developers are not required to rent the most units to income qualified tenants, the amount
of tax credits received increases as the percentage of units occupied by low income residents
goes up. In the data I find on average the share of units reserved for low income residents far
exceeds the 20% and 40% thresholds. The rent limit for these units is 30% of the income level
(50% or 60% of area median) required to satisfy the resident income criteria. In practice, if
90% of the total units are leased to low income tenants, the rent charged on these specific
units is 0.3 × 0.6 = 0.18 or 18% of the monthly median income for the area, adjusted for
household size. An area of concern is the actual affordability of LIHTC units, as the rent is
determined by median income of an entire metropolitan area, while locally a neighborhood
that receives LIHTC could be very poor. Housing studies have shown that the share of
LIHTC units that exceed fair market rents can exceed 30% in many cities (Cummings and
DiPasquale 1999).
The direct effect of LIHTC on a demographic measure like SDIit in principle depends
on several factors. The results of a 2012 survey of LIHTC housing units shows that in terms
of race, who lives in LIHTC depends largely on the region of the country (Hollar 2014).
In southern states like South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana and Georgia many tenants
are black, contrasting with parts of Appalachia like Kentucky or West Virginia where the
majority of LIHTC tenants are white. Davis et al. (2018) relates the households that take
up LIHTC housing as those in the bottom tercile of the housing market income distribution.
Given the potential for LIHTC units to be priced at or above market rents, it is difficult to
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conclude that residents served are those of highest need (McClure 2010).
The exclusion restriction requires the LIHTC shock to only affect mortgages through
changes in school racial diversity, conditional on prices and other neighborhood characteristics. The price index serves to absorb the price effects of variation in neighborhood
amenities following LIHTC development discussed by Diamond and McQuade (2019). The
income controls capture the changes in economic composition of neighbors over time, thus
if the exclusion restriction holds I am able to interpret my estimates as the effect of school
diversity on the median loan to value ratio. An increasing LTV implies lower relative wealth
as a larger share of the house price is shifted from the down payment to the mortgage balance. A decreasing LTV implies higher relative wealth as home buyers mortgage a smaller
fraction of the total house price.

1.4.1

LIHTC Data

I merge data for the timing and location of LIHTC builds from 2000-2014 to the student
demographic data to form the full panel of data. Recall that I restrict the data to school
zones with no LIHTC activity prior to 2000, and either one or zero new LIHTC builds during
the years of observation. In the final sample of 3,661 schools, 25% received new subsidized
housing during the sample period.
The LIHTC data come from HUD and describe the year the units are available for rent,
the number of units put in service, and the physical location of the LIHTC complex. Twothirds of the construction in the sample became active in 2007 or prior with peak construction
in 2006 when 10% of the total projects in my sample became available to rent. Table 1.1
shows that on average LIHTC builds in the sample have about 288 units available for rent,
representing roughly 2.9% of the total housing in the respective school zone. The typical
LIHTC complex in the sample has roughly 260 of the 288 units held aside for low income
tenants. The low income tenant share is well above either of the thresholds required to
receive tax credits. From the HUD data I use the physical address of the LIHTC complex to
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map units to a school zone. The map in figure 1.5 shows the spatial distribution of LIHTC
activity in my sample.

1.4.2

Empirical Effects of LIHTC Development on School Demographics

In this section I estimate the effects of LIHTC on school demographic and economic outcomes
using a dynamic event study model with two-way fixed effects. I predict changes to a given
socioeconomic outcome Yit as a function of exogenous exposure to a LIHTC shock, Zit such
that
0

Yit = Zit π + δPit + γi + γt + ξit .

(1.8)

The coefficient π in equation 1.8 is an estimate of the average effect of new LIHTC development on school characteristics, conditional on school zone and year fixed effects γ. Pit is
the log of the FHFA house price index, and ξit is the exogenous error term. To capture the
variation in outcome Yit that is only related to exogenous effects of LIHTC on the racial
composition of schools, I construct Zit as the interaction of a set of event time indicators
with indicators for whether the school was low or high diversity in 2000

Zit =

10
2 X
X

(Iig × Dik ).

(1.9)

g =1 k =−6

Each of the diversity group indicators Iig are interacted with a dummy Dik = 1 if school
zone i is k years pre or post LIHTC development and 0 otherwise. School zones that are
never treated have the property Dik = 0 for each panel observation. The interacted event
study instruments approximate school i0 s exposure to LIHTC as a function of both the time
since units become available for rent and the intensity of the Yit response as predicted by the
pre-treatment school diversity type. Substituting equation 1.9 into equation 1.8, I express
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the event study model as

Yit =

2 X
10
X

(Iig × Dik )πgk + δPit + γi + γt + ξit .

(1.10)

g =1 k =−6

πgk is a set of g × k coefficients that map the estimated average treatment effect of LIHTC on
school diversity for each k = 6 years pre to 10 years post development, by initial neighborhood
type g. With the two way fixed effects my identification stems from changes within a school
zone over time, controlling for time invariant attendance zone characteristics and year specific
changes to Yit . Included in my estimation of equation 1.10 are census division specific linear
time trends to capture general demographic shifts unique to different regions of the country.
I estimate equation 1.10 separately for white, black, Hispanic, and Asian enrollment
counts and two income measures - home buyer income and the fraction of students receiving
free lunch. The heterogeneous event study coefficients πgk are plotted in figure 1.6 through
figure 1.11. On the horizontal axis is the time (in years) k since the new LIHTC units became
available at k = 0. On the vertical axis is the magnitude of the effect on each Yit outcome.
Each point represents the average effect of LIHTC k years away from the in service year,
relative to one year prior at k = −1. Following the literature, I exclude observations where
school zones receive LIHTC in the year 2000, as there are no pre-treatment observations for
this initial cohort. These estimates trace out the average effect of the subsidized housing
development on my socioeconomic measures over time, by school or neighborhood type.
The effect of LIHTC on white enrollment counts shown in figure 1.6 imply a substantial
increase of white students in low diversity schools, with a smaller magnitude decrease in high
diversity schools. The positive effect in low diversity schools is gradual, with no immediate
jump in the year units become available or one year post development. Instead, beginning
in year two white enrollment rises consistently until peaking at year five. The nature of this
effect implies that white residents are moving near low diversity schools not because of LIHTC
take up, but in a way consistent with gentrification and improved neighborhood quality
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following new LIHTC development as proposed by Diamond and McQuade (2019). The
gradual decrease in high diversity areas is (non-exhaustive) evidence that white households
that choose to live near development have preferences over pre-existing characteristics of
schools near development.
The estimated effects for black and Hispanic enrollment are presented in figures 1.7 and
1.8. Again, I find heterogeneous effects by initial school type, albeit an opposite pattern from
the behavior of whites. Black and Hispanic enrollments rise in high diversity schools and
fall in low diversity schools. The small initial bump in high diversity schools for years zero
and one suggest the at least part of this change in driven by black and Hispanic residents of
the new LIHTC development. After this initial increase, black enrollment growth declines
and Hispanic enrollment growth remains flat for the large part of the event window. In low
diversity schools the enrollment of both groups decreases, and although the evidence is not
conclusive this is potentially a product of rising prices following the in migration of white
residents near low diversity schools. For completeness, figure 1.9 shows that Asian student
enrollment decreases over time in high diversity schools following LIHTC, with a very small
predicted increase in low diversity schools.
Two measures of neighborhood income are tested in the event study framework and
plotted in figures 1.10 and 1.11. Home buyer income and the number of students receiving
free lunch subsidies address two different regions of the income distribution. The former is
more closely related to the upper end of the income distribution while the latter is more
related to poverty levels in the neighborhood. The covariance between the two is importantif home buyer income is increasing as the number of students receiving free lunch increases,
it is an indication of rising neighborhood inequality. Figures 1.10 and 1.11 show that LIHTC
development does not fundamentally change home buyer income or the fraction of students
receiving free lunch, holding home values constant. Given that both of these estimates
are smooth and continuous across the event-time threshold, I argue that my event-study
model identifies exogenous changes in school demographics around the timing of LIHTC
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development.

1.5

Instrumenting for Changes to Neighborhood Diversity

To estimate the causal effect of school demographic changes on neighborhood mortgage values, I construct a shift-share instrument for SDIit based on predicted demographic changes
traced out in section 1.4.2. Starting with the observed enrollment counts used to construct
initial values of SDIit in the year 2000, I apply the growth rate of the predicted counts from
the event study model to project exogenous growth of school enrollment shares for each racial
group. The result of this procedure is an exogenously determined shock to school diversity,
g . My use of the shift share instrument most closely follows from Derenoncourt (2018)
SDI
it

and Boustan (2010), however these measures have been employed widely in various urban
and regional growth settings (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2018).
The predicted enrollment growth rate of each race group r for school i in year t can be
expressed as
ĝrit =

n̂rit − n̂rit−1
,
n̂rit−1

(1.11)

where n̂rit is the fitted value population count generated by model 1.10. Recall that SDIit
in the year 2000, used to categorize schools into initial types, is generated from the year
2000 enrollment shares as in equation 1.1. Behind the year 2000 shares are the observed
population counts from that year, nri00 . One year after this initial period I calculate

e rit = nri00 × (1 + ĝrit ).
n

(1.12)

e rit+1 = n
e rit × (1 + ĝrit+1 ).
n

(1.13)

For each year to follow, we have

22

These predicted growth adjusted population counts for each of the five race groups are used
to construct the growth adjusted shares
e rit
n
.
serit = P5
e rit
r =1 n

(1.14)

g
I then calculate SDI
it using the growth adjusted shares in 1.14 and the procedure of section

1.2.1. To estimate the effects of diversity on mortgage values, I specify a two-stage least
g .
squares model where I instrument for diversity using SDI
it

1.5.1

2SLS Effect of SDIit on Mortgage Values

I model the log of median mortgage values in school zone i, year t as a function of school
diversity and other local characteristics in a two stage least squares specification. The first
stage is

0

g +δ P +X β+γ +γ +ξ ,
SDIit = δ1 SDI
2 it
t
it
i
it
it

(1.15)

and the main estimating equation takes the form
0

d +λ P +X β+γ +γ + .
Mit = λ1 SDI
2 it
t
it
i
it
it

(1.16)

Covariates Xit include median mortgage borrower income and the fraction of subsidized
lunch students; along with the log of total enrollment, and the log of full time teacher
headcounts to control for changes to school level inputs. Additionally I include separate
dummy variables for a school zone in a large city, a small city, or large suburban area.
Each of these categorical variables are interacted a linear time trend to absorb locale-specific
trends in housing markets.The assumption is that the effect of macro-economic housing
market trends during the sample period are constant across neighborhoods in similar city.
I present the results of my preferred model in table 1.3. Each of the models shown
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include school zone and year fixed effects but vary in the inclusion of the explanatory controls
for income and home buyer demographics. On average, price-constant mortgage values in
a school zone increase as the nearby school becomes more diverse. Mortgage values are
predicted to rise by roughly 5% for a one standard deviation increase of SDIit of 2.56,
controlling for median prices and attendance zone fixed effects. The estimate is robust to
controlling for changes in neighborhood income and the fraction of non-white home buyers.
This result suggest that as schools become more diverse, the average home buyer borrows
more for a similarly priced home in real prices. In principle this implies a rising loan to value
ratio for the median house near diversifying schools.

1.5.2

The Effect of SDIit on Mortgages, by Home Buyer Race

Higher loan to value ratios as predicted by my model imply that home buyers near diversifying schools are making smaller down payments as a fraction of the sale price. Since I
control for prices, the positive effect on LTV suggested by my estimate is driven by variation
in mortgage values not associated with changing local price levels. If down payment ability
is largely explained by wealth, the next step is to test how the main effect varies by race
of the buyer. To do this I estimate equation 1.16 for the mortgage value index calculated
separately for buyers of each race group. The results are shown in table 1.5.
The results in table 1.5 show the average effect of school diversity on loan amounts is
consistent across borrower race group. If borrowers near diverse schools have less wealth
and make smaller down payments, my model fails to reject he hypothesis that the effect
is consistent across race and ethnic groups. Each specification includes income controls,
suggesting that higher wealth households within each race group tend to sort away from
diverse schools. The model predicts that one outcome of the racial wealth gaps shows
up in the borrowing levels of white households near diversifying, low-income schools. White
buyers in these areas make larger down payments as a percentage of the sell price on average,
decreasing the loan amount relative to all home buyers in other areas.
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1.5.3

2SLS Effect of SDIit on Prices

The price constant analysis of mortgages in the prior sections suggest that home buyers
near diversifying schools have lower levels of wealth, regardless of racial background. The
price index measure has an important property a measure of constant-quality price levels in
a given area. In theory, observed price changes are then driven by factors related to local
amenities like schools. I test for the effect of exogenous diversity on the house price index
by estimating a version of equation 1.16 that takes the log of the house price index as the
dependent variable. The results are presented in table 1.6.
Columns one through four are fixed effects estimates that vary by inclusion of various
explanatory variable types. The results are small but precisely measured negative effect of
diversity on house prices. Column five is the 2SLS estimate, which suggests that when SDIit
increases by one standard deviation, or 2.54, prices fall by roughly 2.8%. This is consistent
with theories of decentralized sorting. In this context decentralized sorting suggests that
housing near majority white schools will demand higher prices when preferences against
high minority enrollment shares exist. The result in column five is robust to controlling for
changes in income and the racial characteristics of home buyers.

1.6

Discussion

It is possible for the effects of LIHTC correlated with racial diversity changes could bias
the estimate of the effect of diversity on prices. The exclusion restriction holds, however,
when prices are used as a control in the mortgage regressions. I assert that time varying
changes in the mortgage index associated with the LIHTC instrument is be captured by
the aggregate price index and income controls. Including the home buyer income and racial
characteristics, local poverty levels, along with prices allows me to identify a causal effect
changes in school diversity on mortgage borrowing levels. The results of this paper provide
evidence that lower wealth home buyers select housing near diversifying schools. As diversity
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levels rise the median loan to value ratio rises, implying smaller down payments made for
purchases in these areas.
If, as the model suggests, prices indeed decrease when schools become more diverse, home
buyers benefit from lower prices but leverage a larger percentage of the value in a home loan.
The literature has shown that higher loan to value ratios predict the probability of default
on a loan (Floros and White 2016). This could contribute to poorer loan performance near
diverse schools as a byproduct of lower wealth households sorting into these areas. My results
suggest wealth based sorting is present for home buyers in each race group of my sample.
I posit two potential explanations for rising mortgage values occurring simultaneously
with falling home values. It is possible that as schools become more diverse, new home buyers
select a higher quantity of housing as compared to the quantity of housing measured by the
house price index, which approximates price changes of physically comparable homes over
time. This implies that rising mortgage values are associated with higher wealth households
locating near diversifying schools and purchasing larger/higher quality homes. An alternative
explanation is decreased demand for housing near diversifying schools reduces home values
as some households with preferences against diverse schools exit. Boustan (2010) argue that
this behavior contributed to increases in black home ownership from 1950-1980, when home
values in the central city decreased as white households moved to suburban areas. In my
case mortgage values are rising as lower wealth households sort near diverse schools and
buy homes at lower values, but borrow more in terms of real mortgage amounts as wealth
constrains down payment ability.
My analysis also sheds light on a potential mechanism by which gentrification of lowincome areas takes place. In low-income, diversifying areas white home buyers borrower have
lower loan to value ratios which imply larger down payment percentages. This is a secondary
effect of wealth as this result does not hold for buyers of other racial backgrounds. It follows
that white home buyers with preferences for diverse schools can gain a higher quantity of
housing services and incur less mortgage interest expense over the life of the loan. This
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makes low-income, diversifying areas attractive for white home buyers with higher down
payment ability.

1.7

Conclusion

In this paper I test how theoretical predictions of neighborhood choice models affect mortgage
markets as local public schools become more racially diverse. Using panel data describing
school demographic characteristics I find that mortgage values rise as schools become more
diverse, holding aggregate home prices constant. The effect holds for home buyers of each
race and ethnic group in the data. I also find suggestive evidence that home values decline
following school diversity shocks from LIHTC rental development. Two potential mechanisms
are presented to explain changes to these two housing market measures, both implying
changes to neighborhood wealth. Testing the model over various subsets of the data, I find
suggestive evidence that the effect varies by neighborhood type. My results suggest that
sorting over school demographics can change the relative wealth levels of households and
home buyers in neighborhoods near diversifying schools.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample

Low Diversity

High Diversity

Real mortgage value ($2014)

237,094.75
(111153.9)

221,693.82
(89719.7)

250,772.12
(125650.8)

Real home buyer income

87,039.43
(35326.8)

85,278.73
(31915.4)

88,603.08
(38042.2)

School Diversity Index, 2000

4.64
(2.564)

1.59
(0.934)

6.19
(1.537)

School Diversity Index, 2014

5.96
(2.334)

4.51
(2.199)

7.24
(1.581)

Fraction Black

0.15
(0.196)

0.11
(0.201)

0.19
(0.185)

Fraction Hispanic

0.24
(0.232)

0.16
(0.204)

0.31
(0.232)

Fraction Asian

0.06
(0.0907)

0.05
(0.0826)

0.07
(0.0964)

School Enrollment

795.45
(345.4)

751.64
(358.2)

834.36
(328.8)

Fraction Free Lunch

0.40
(0.251)

0.32
(0.243)

0.47
(0.238)

Neighborhoods with LIHTC

0.25
(0.432)

0.23
(0.420)

0.27
(0.442)

LIHTC units per build

288.28
(168.62)

278.98
(165.92)

294.99
(170.89)

Neighborhood housing units

9,703.09
(7830.2)

8,315.91
(5983.9)

11,001.73
(9039.9)

3,661
54,915

1,905
27,645
0.52

1,756
29,502
0.48

Middle Schools
School×Year Observations
Share of Total LIHTC

Notes: The school diversity index is described in the empirical strategy and takes a value
between 0 and 10, with 10 being most diverse. The mean number of LIHTC units per build
is calculated with only school zones that received the treatment. Neighborhood total housing
units include estimates of all occupied and vacant housing of all types.
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Table 1.2: OLS Effect of School Diversity on Local Mortgage Values
Dependent Variable :
Log(Mortgage Value Index)

(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

(3)
OLS

(4)
OLS

SDI

0.00154
(0.00157)

0.00129
(0.00160)

-0.00146
(0.00111)

-0.00149
(0.00111)

Log(House Price Index)

0.879∗∗∗
(0.0110)

0.876∗∗∗
(0.0111)

0.564∗∗∗
(0.0118)

0.566∗∗∗
(0.0113)

48026
0.854
×

48026
0.855
×
×

48026
0.909
×
×
×

48026
0.909
×
×
×
×

N
r2
School Zone & Year FE
School and Neighborhood Covariates
Income Characteristics
Buyer Race Demographics

Standard errors are clustered at the school zone level and shown in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.3: 2SLS Effect of School Diversity on Local Mortgage Values
Dependent Variable:
Log(Mortgage Value Index)

(1)
2SLS

(2)
2SLS

(3)
2SLS

(4)
2SLS

d
SDI

0.0283∗∗∗
(0.00515)

0.0286∗∗∗
(0.00534)

0.0201∗∗∗
(0.00389)

0.0202∗∗∗
(0.00389)

Log(HPI)

0.888∗∗∗
(0.0115)

0.889∗∗∗
(0.0115)

0.583∗∗∗
(0.0125)

0.584∗∗∗
(0.0119)

44492
0.564
329.7
×

43603
0.560
318.2
×
×

40979
0.714
312.2
×
×
×

40979
0.716
315.6
×
×
×
×

N
r2
Fstat
School Zone & Year FE
School and Neighborhood Covariates
Income Characteristics
Buyer Race Demographics

Standard errors are clustered at the school zone level and shown in parentheses
dit of approx 2.5 increases mortgage values approx 5%, indicative of smaller
A 1 std. dev increase in SDI
down payments.

30

Table 1.4: Reduced Form Effect of Shift-Share Instrument on Local Mortgages
Dependent Variable:
Log(Mortgage Value Index)

(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

(3)
OLS

(4)
OLS

g
SDI

0.0500∗∗∗
(0.00843)

0.0499∗∗∗
(0.00864)

0.0355∗∗∗
(0.00641)

0.0359∗∗∗
(0.00643)

Log(HPI)

0.882∗∗∗
(0.0112)

0.881∗∗∗
(0.0114)

0.576∗∗∗
(0.0122)

0.578∗∗∗
(0.0116)

44786
0.851
×

43618
0.852
×
×

40979
0.905
×
×
×

40979
0.906
×
×
×
×

N
r2
School Zone & Year FE
School and Neighborhood Covariates
Income Characteristics
Buyer Race Demographics

Standard errors are clustered at the school zone level and shown in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports reduced form estimates for the shift-share diversity levels regressed
on the mortgage value index. School and neighborhood controls include total enrollment,
teacher counts and time trends interacted with indicators for urban and suburban school
types. Income characteristics are median home buyer income and the fraction of students
receiving free lunch subsidies in the school.
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Table 1.5: 2SLS Effect of School Diversity on Local Mortgages, by Race of Buyer
Dependent Variable:
Log(Mortgage Value Index)

2SLS
White

2SLS
Black

2SLS
Hispanic

2SLS
Asian

d
SDI

0.0271∗∗∗
(0.00454)

0.0242∗
(0.0101)

0.0248∗∗
(0.00768)

0.0176
(0.0105)

d × Low-Income
SDI

-0.0414∗∗∗
(0.0105)

0.00531
(0.0268)

-0.0111
(0.0193)

0.00404
(0.0340)

40258
0.430
160.0
×
×
×

22264
0.127
136.0
×
×
×

28618
0.187
149.6
×
×
×

24058
0.172
135.3
×
×
×

N
r2
Fstat
School Zone & Year FE
House Price Controls
Neighborhood and Buyer Controls

Standard errors are clustered at the school zone level and shown in parentheses
White home buyers near diverse, low-income schools make larger down payments.
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Table 1.6: The Effect of School Diversity on Local House Prices

Log(House Price Index)
d
SDI

N
r2
Fstat
School Zone & Year FE
School and Nbhood Controls
Income Characteristics
Buyer Race Demographics

(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

(3)
OLS

(4)
OLS

(5)
2SLS

-0.00187
(0.00240)

-0.00425
(0.00236)

-0.00650∗∗∗
(0.00177)

-0.00577∗∗
(0.00177)

-0.0112∗
(0.00527)

51570
0.760

50576
0.766

47430
0.841

47430
0.846

×

×
×

×
×
×

×
×
×
×

43790
0.343
307.0
×
×
×
×

Standard errors are clustered at the school zone level and shown in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports OLS and two-stage least squares estimates for the effect of school
diversity (SDI) on the house price index. The instrument for SDI is the shift-share diversity
levels as predicted by the LIHTC development shock. The mean and standard deviation
of SDI are 4.64 and 2.56, respectively. School and neighborhood controls include total
enrollment, teacher counts and time trends interacted with indicators for urban and suburban
school types. Income characteristics are median home buyer income and the fraction of
students receiving free lunch subsidies in the school.
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Table 1.7: The Effect of School Diversity on Local Mortgages, by Neighborhood Type
Dependent Variable
Log(Mortgage Value Index)

(1)
2SLS

(2)
2SLS

(3)
2SLS

(4)
2SLS

(5)
2SLS

d
SDI

0.0164∗∗∗
(0.00473)

-0.0102
(0.0153)

0.0217∗∗∗
(0.00409)

0.0306∗∗∗
(0.00480)

0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00398)

d × High-Diversity
SDI

0.000986
(0.00480)
0.0559∗∗
(0.0180)

d ×Majority White
SDI

-0.0188∗
(0.00930)

d × Low-Income
SDI

-0.0200∗∗∗
(0.00510)

d × Urban
SDI
d × Basis Boost
SDI

N
r2
Fstat
School Zone & Year FE
House Price Controls
Neighborhood and Buyer Controls

-0.0108
(0.0124)
40979
0.721
196.0
×
×
×

40979
0.695
104.0
×
×
×

40437
0.714
164.1
×
×
×

40979
0.709
162.1
×
×
×

Standard errors are clustered at the school zone level and shown in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports two-stage least squares estimates for the effect of school diversity
(SDI) on median mortgage values across different neighborhood types. Low-income areas
are those where school zone median income is in the bottom tercile of the state distribution.
Basis boost areas are those where LIHTC development will receive additional subsidies
as outline by program guidelines. The house price index and all other home buyer and
neighborhood controls are included in each specification. The instrument for SDI is the
shift-share diversity levels as predicted by the LIHTC development shock. The mean and
standard deviation of SDI are 4.64 and 2.56, respectively. School and neighborhood controls
include total enrollment, teacher counts and time trends interacted with indicators for urban
and suburban school types. Income characteristics are median home buyer income and the
fraction of students receiving free lunch subsidies in the school.
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40979
0.714
157.7
×
×
×

Table 1.8: The Effect of School Diversity on Local House Prices, by Neighborhood Type
Dependent Variable:
Log(House Price Index)

(1)
2SLS

(2)
2SLS

(3)
2SLS

(4)
2SLS

(5)
2SLS

d
SDI

-0.0207∗
(0.00906)

-0.0221
(0.0154)

-0.0118∗
(0.00538)

-0.00458
(0.00632)

-0.0107∗
(0.00537)

d × High-Diversity
SDI

0.00970
(0.00792)

d × Majority White
SDI

0.0240
(0.0200)

d × Low-Income
SDI

0.0103
(0.0148)

d × Urban
SDI

-0.00810
(0.00682)

d × Boost
SDI

N
r2
Fstat
School Zone & Year FE
House Price Controls
Neighborhood and Buyer Controls

-0.00865
(0.0152)
43790
0.354
189.8
×
×
×
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43790
0.360
137.6
×
×
×

43217
0.346
158.2
×
×
×

43790
0.349
158.2
×
×
×

43790
0.344
154.4
×
×
×

Figures

Figure 1.1: The shaded grey areas are middle school zones used as neighborhoods
in my sample. Boundaries are fixed to 2009 attendance zones publicly available at
https://www.sabinsdata.org/.
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(a) The distribution of SDIit in 2000.

(b) The distribution of SDIit in 2014.

Figure 1.2: The distribution of schools by racial diversity as measured by SDIit . Schools
have generally become more diverse from 2000 to 2014 as evidenced by a larger mass on the
right half of the distribution.
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(a) Entire Sample

(b) Low Income Schools

(c) Middle Income Schools

(d) High Income Schools

Figure 1.3: The shape of the distribution of schools by racial diversity as measured by SDIit
is persistent across income levels.
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Figure 1.4: A binned scatter plot of the raw data shows a positive unconditional correlation
between neighborhood diversity and mortgage values.
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Figure 1.5: The dots represent individual LIHTC developments from 2000-2014 in my sample
middle school zones.
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Figure 1.6: This diagram is a plot of the event study coefficients πgk from regression equation
1.10 for g = 1, the low diversity group. The model predicts an increase in diversity for these
school types following LIHTC.
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Figure 1.7: This diagram is a plot of the event study coefficients πgk from regression equation
1.10 for g = 1, the low diversity group. The model predicts an increase in diversity for these
school types following LIHTC.
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Figure 1.8: This diagram is a plot of the event study coefficients πgk from regression equation
1.10 for g = 2, the high diversity group. The model predicts a decrease in diversity for these
school types following LIHTC.
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Figure 1.9: This diagram is a plot of the event study coefficients πgk from regression equation
1.10 for g = 1, the low diversity group. The model predicts an increase in diversity for these
school types following LIHTC.
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Figure 1.10: This is a plot of the event study coefficients from regressing log(applicant
income) on the interacted event time dummies and the covariates included in first stage, for
the initially low diversity school zones. For the low diversity school zones, the income of new
home buyers did not change near the event time.
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Figure 1.11: This is a plot of the event study coefficients from regressing log(applicant
income) on the interacted event time dummies and the covariates included in first stage, for
the initially high diversity school zones. For the high diversity school zones, the income of
new home buyers did not change near the event time.
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Figure 1.12: This diagram is a plot of the event study coefficients πgk from regression equation
1.10 for g = 1, the low diversity group. The model predicts an increase in diversity for these
school types following LIHTC.
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Figure 1.13: This diagram is a plot of the event study coefficients πgk from regression equation
1.10 for g = 1, the low diversity group. The model predicts an increase in diversity for these
school types following LIHTC.
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Chapter 2
Is Spending on Schools Valuable and
Efficient? A National Study of the
Capitalization of School Spending and
Local Taxes (with Pat Bayer and
Peter Q. Blair)

2.1

Introduction

Our paper speaks to a longstanding debate in economics on whether there exists a decentralized system for efficiently providing public goods. Musgrave (1939) and Samuelson (1954)
argued that such a system does not exist and as a result public goods would be subject to
under-provision because of the free-rider problem. Tiebout (1956) argued that while this
may be true at the federal level, that at the local level, inter-jurisdictional competition over
the level of public goods provided and the corresponding taxes levied to provide these public
goods could lead to efficient matching between households and jurisdictions, given a suf49

ficiently thick market of jurisdictions, and low mobility cost for households, among other
assumptions.
A natural implication of the efficient allocation of public goods in a system of local
governments, which motivated Oates (1969) and many subsequent empirical studies,1 is that
an additional dollar raised locally and spent on a local public good should have no effect on
property values.2 If, instead, such an investment increased demand to live in a community
(and thus raised property values), the level of local goods provision was inefficiently low.
Many early empirical studies of this efficiency condition suffered from a host of endogeneity
problems; while more recent papers, for example Cellini et al. (2010) which use a credible
identification strategy are done in the context of a specific state and focus on a particular
subset of school expenditures – infrastructure spending. Our main contribution is to study
this 50-year old question in an empirical setting that provides plausibly exogenous variation
in both local tax revenues and school spending that covers a national geography over a long
time span.
Expenditures on education in the U.S. represent 7.3% of GDP. A key component of this
expenditure is investments in K-12 education, which is partially funded by local property
taxes. The use of local taxes as a funding mechanism makes the U.S. context a powerful
laboratory for studying education as an investment, when compared to its OECD peer countries, where education is primarily funded through the central government. To the extent
that expenditures on schools are valued by households, these expenditures should be capitalized into house prices. This is a direct implication of Tiebout (1956). This capitalization of
school expenditures into house prices is therefore a revealed preference estimate of the value
of investing in education. Likewise, the negative capitalization of local property taxes into
house prices is a revealed-preference estimate of the cost-side of investing in education. The
efficient production of education requires equalization, on the margin, between the benefits
1 See

Church (1974) and Rosen and Fullerton (1977).

2 Important theoretical contributions to this literature include Edel and Sclar (1974),

Sonstelie and Portney
(1978), Wildasin (1979), Yinger (1982), Brueckner (1982) and Epple and Zelenitz (1984).
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and cost of education (Oates, 1969).
The most compelling estimates of house price capitalization in the market for education
employ a boundary discontinuity design (BDD) in which researchers attribute differences in
house prices across school attendance boundaries to differences in the average test scores
across the attendance boundaries (Black 1999; Bayer et al. 2007; Kane et al. 2006). To
obtain a clean estimate of how much households value test scores the BDD holds constant:
housing characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, school spending, and taxes.
While the BDD has contributed fundamentally to our understanding of the willingness
to pay for higher test scores, it has three important limitations when it comes to fully understanding education as an investment good and testing whether expenditures on schooling is
efficient. First, the boundary discontinuity estimates in the literature do not provide a direct
measure of the capitalization of school expenditures into house prices. Because households
vote over school expenditures, obtaining reduced form estimates of how much households
value school expenditures is the direct object of policy interest, as opposed to test scores
(Cellini et al., 2010). While increased school spending increases test scores, it also affects
long-term outcomes like adult wages and employment, as showed by Jackson et al. (2015);
hence, boundary discontinuity measurements of test score capitalization into house prices
may understate the full return on investing in education.3
Second, because the BDD holds both school spending and taxes constant, it cannot be
used to measure the reduced-form elasticities of school spending or local taxes on house prices,
both of which are necessary ingredients for testing for efficiency of school expenditures.
Third, the external validity of most BDD studies in the literature is limited because
these studies focus on a narrow geography at a single point in time (Black 1999; Bayer
et al. 2007; Kane et al. 2006). For example, Black (1999) uses on house price data from 3
suburban counties in Massachusetts (Middlesex, Essex, and Norfolk) over a 3-year period
(1993-1995). Likewise, Bayer et al. (2007) relies on restricted-used census data and house
3 There is also a large literature on test score fade-out which suggests that test score impacts have limits
when it comes to evaluating the long-term effectiveness of educational interventions (Elango et al., 2016).
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prices transaction data from 6 counties in the San Francisco Bay Area for a single year
(1990). The narrow geographic and temporal focus of BDD studies is a natural consequence
of the extensive data requirements of this empirical design. Moreover, this methodology is
not well-suited to areas that are sparsely populated, which includes most rural counties in
the US and some suburban areas.
In this paper, we overcome the core limitations of the BDD by pairing annual subschool district data on house price indices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
with a source of plausibly exogenous variation in school expenditures and local taxes. Our
instrument for school expenditures leverages variation in the timing of the court-mandated
school finance reforms (SFRs), which rolled out across 25 states over a 39-year period (19712009). Jackson et al. (2015) demonstrated that these court mandated SFRs induced plausibly
exogenous variation in school funding that shrunk the gap in per pupil expenditure between
school districts in the top and bottom quartiles of the pre-reform distribution of school
expenditure. We provide crisp evidence that the court mandated SFRs also induced variation
in tax revenue that is not collinear with the changes in per pupil expenditure. Hoxby
(2001) makes this point theoretically, arguing that SFRs that increase redistribution created
incentives for richer school districts to shrink their tax base. Hoxby and Kuziemko (2004)
also provide empirical support for this insight using the 1994 SFR in Texas. We leverage
the school spending and local tax variation induced by a national sample of SFRs to jointly
estimate the elasticity of house prices with respect to school spending and taxes, and then
use these two elasticities to test for efficiency in the level of expenditures on schooling.
We employ an event study design to show that house prices appreciated in school districts
where per-pupil expenditure increased because of redistribution due to the court-mandated
SFRs. In our first empirical specification, we regress the log of the FHFA house price index
on the log of per pupil school expenditures in the census tract, instrumenting for the per
pupil expenditure with SFR event-time dummies that are interacted with the school district’s
pre-reform quartile in the per pupil expenditure distribution. We find an elasticity of housing
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price appreciation with respect to school expenditures of 0.86. As predicted by economic
theory, we find that the house price capitalization is greater in places where the housing
supply is less elastic (Cellini et al., 2005; Gyourko et al., 2013). Accordingly, the elasticity
of house prices with respect to school expenditure is largest in urban areas ( = 1.1) and
smallest in rural areas ( = 0.8).
Consistent with the SFRs increasing house prices, we find that the fraction of poor
students in a school district declines as a result of these exogenous increases in school expenditure. Some low-income households are priced out of these neighborhoods. While these
reforms do induce sorting, we find that the house price capitalization effects in our paper are
primarily driven by the direct effect of increased school expenditures rather than the secondary sorting effects (Lafortune et al., 2018). Controlling for the fraction students who are:
poor, black, white and Hispanic in the district, we find that our house price capitalization
elasticity falls by just 17%, i.e. from  = 0.86 to  = 0.71.
To test for whether expenditures on schools is efficient, we augment our specification to
include the log of tax revenues as an explanatory variable. We also instrument the log of tax
revenues using the event-time dummies interacted with the dummy variables for pre-reform
expenditure quartiles. We find that a 1% increase in school expenditures increases house
prices by 0.78%, whereas a 1% increase in tax revenue decreases house prices by 0.17%. Tax
increases are most negatively capitalized in suburban areas and rural areas ( = −0.21). Our
estimates suggest that, increasing tax revenues by 1% in order to increase expenditure on
schools would increase house prices by 0.06% (p-value 0.66), on average. The current level
of education spending is therefore efficient, overall. This can be seen as a triumph of the
Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1969).
Disaggregating the efficiency estimate of education spending by geography, we find that
a 1% increase in taxes to fund schools would increase house prices in urban areas by 0.19%,
which while statistically insignificant (p-value: 0.26) is 3 times the average across all geographies and nearly an order of magnitude larger than the size of the capitalization effects

53

in suburban and rural areas. This suggests education expenditures may be inefficiently low
in urban areas. Performing the same efficiency calculation in suburban and rural areas
yields both a statistical zero and an economically trivial impact of increased taxes to fund
schools on house prices. The point estimate is 0.02% (p-value = 0.86) in suburban areas and
0.0008% (p-value = 0.99) in rural areas. Correspondingly, the level of education expenditures
in suburban and rural areas is approximately efficient.
While education is funded efficiently on average, the allocation of school expenditures
across educational inputs may be suboptimal. To test for optimality in the allocation of
educational inputs, we separate expenditures into two broad categories – salary expenses
and non-salary expenses and regress the log of the FHFA home price indices on the log
of salary and non-salary spending. We find that expenses on salary are highly capitalized
into house prices. A 1% increase in expenditures on salaries increases house prices by 2.2%.
Moreover, this large price effect is nearly uniform across geography. Non-salary expenditures,
by contrast, are negatively capitalized to prices with an elasticity of -0.8. This suggest
two things. First, the optimal mix of salary to non-salary expenditure would favor more
expenditures on salaries and less expenditures on other inputs relative to the status quo.
Second, households are discriminating in what types of school spending that they value.
Given the evidence that increased expenditures on teacher salaries from SRFs increased
student performance more than non-salary expenditures it also appears that households are
rational (Brunner et al., 2019).
Our paper also contributes to several lines of the literature on court-ordered school finance
reforms. Murray et al. (1998) and Card and Payne (2002) showed that these reforms reduced
inequality in school spending across districts and subsequent work including Jackson et al.
(2015), Lafortune et al. (2018), Hyman (2017), Brunner et al. (2019), and Biasi (2017)
provide evidence of an impact of the corresponding school spending changes on long term life
outcomes, student test scores, and economic mobility. Our paper contributes most directly
to this literature by showing that parents and other residents of local communities observe
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and highly value these changes in spending. In addition to the implications of the resulting
capitalization and sorting for schools and cities, the size of these effects on property values
provides a form of corroborating evidence for the large effects of spending on life outcomes
estimated in Jackson et al. (2015). In the tradition of Hoxby and Kuziemko (2004), our
paper also exploits the fact that many SFRs changed the incentives that local governments
had to raise revenue through local taxes. We use this variation to simultaneously estimate
the hedonic value of both school spending and local taxes, thereby providing a modern test
for efficiency of school spending that follows in the tradition of (Oates, 1969) and (Cellini
et al., 2010).
Finally, our paper contributes to the economics of education literature on what types
of school spending matter. Hanushek (1986) provides an early summary of this literature,
which is built on by more recent papers by Cellini et al. (2010), Lavy (2015), Brunner et al.
(2019), and Martorell et al. (2016) who measure the returns to educational expenditure on
both teachers and school infrastructure.

2.2

Data

We combine data from several sources to form a balanced panel of school expenditure and
house price data covering the years 1990-2015.

2.2.1

Local House Price Indicies

Our data on home values come from a house price index (HPI) that is constructed by the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) using a national data set on conventional mortgages
that covers the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The mortgage data underlying the
HPI is collected by FHFA from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government sponsored
enterprises with a congressional mandate to increase home ownership in the US through
providing a secondary market for conventional mortgages. A key feature of this HPI is

55

that it is a “constant quality” index. To control for quality, the index tracts changes over
time in the price of houses that have been sold or refinanced multiple times. Moreover,
the index employs a weighting procedure that allows for greater sampling variability in the
price appreciation for houses that experience a longer time between transactions.4 Both the
repeated-sales nature and the weighting scheme that is proportional to the transaction time
following the weighted repeat-sales (WRS) index methodology developed in Case and Shiller
(1989).
For our purposes the FHFA HPI has two distinct advantages relative to the Case Schiller
Index. First, FHFA HPI varies at the census tract level, whereas the Case-Schiller HPI varies
at the metro-level. A census tract is a geographic area that is with a population of on average
4,000 people. Because we are using with-in state variation in school expenditures to estimate
the house price capitalization of school expenditures, the local variation in the FHFA HPI
allows us to more precisely estimate the house price capitalization effects. Second, the CaseShiller Indices does not have house price data from 13 states, whereas the FHFA has data on
all states. The Case-Shiller indices do not include data from: Texas, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah and
Wyoming because these states do not require the disclosure of house sale prices on deeds.
The FHFA HPI has two distinct weaknesses relative to the Case-Shiller Index. First, the
Case-Shiller Index uses data from the county assessors and recorders offices, which includes
all transactions, whereas the FHFA HPI only includes data on conforming mortgages, i.e.
mortgages below a certain cut-off value and above a certain loan to income value (LTV). As
of 2019, the conforming limit in expensive markets coastal housing markets is a loan value
of $726,525 and the minimum LTV is 3%.5 Relatedly, the Case-Shiller Index value-weights
the house prices, whereas the FHFA HPI weights housing transactions observations equally.
4 As

noted in Calhoun (1996), given two identical properties, differential rates of appreciation, change in
the neighborhood socio-demographics and other idiosyncratic deviations from market-level mean appreciation
are more liable to arise the longer the time between transactions. This motivates using a generalized least
squares weighting procedure in which the variance in house price appreciation is quadratic in the time
between consecutive transactions for a given property.
5 The conforming limit is $484,350 in the least expensive housing markets.
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This suggests that the FHFA HPI will be an under-estimate of the HPI and especially in
more expensive census tracts (Cellini et al., 2005). The second disadvantage of the FHFA
HPI relative to the Case-Shiller Index is that includes observations based on refinancing,
which are based on appraisals rather than transaction prices. The Case-Shiller index only
includes purchase prices.
By using the FHFA HPI rather than the Case-Shiller Index we are trading off the use
of better house price variation in the FHFA (due to the superior coverage across states and
finer level of geographic reporting of the HPI within state) against having estimates that
are measured with more noise (due to the limits deriving from the loan cut-offs imposed
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the choice to include house price appraisal values
from the refinancing). We are prepared to make this trade-off because we believe that
the gains in precision from having better geographic variation in house prices that pairs
with the geographic variation in the school expenditure outweighs the greater potential for
measurement error. Moreover, to the extent that the measurement error varies across space
and time in systematic ways, the school district fixed effects and time fixed effects in our
regressions will absorb some of the systematic variation in the measurement error, hopefully
leaving us with just classical measurement error, which would bias against us finding house
price capitalization of school expenditures.
In addition to these price data we use measures of housing supply elasticity and indicator
variables for whether a census tract is located in an urban, suburban or a rural area to test
for heterogeneity in the capitalization of schools spending and local taxes into house prices.
The supply elasticities are from Saiz (2010) and are constructed to capture the metropolitan
area (MSA) supply elasticity as a function of the regulatory environment, terrain and the
availability of land for development.6 In Table 2.1, we provide summary statistics for the
house price data, the census tract geography data and the other sources of data that we use
6 Zoning

and regulatory constraints are measured by the Wharton Regulatory Index and the elasticity is
representative of the year 2010. Saiz (2010) uses GIS technology to recovery estimates for available land
supply and the fraction of the land available for development.
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in the project which we will describe in subsequent sections.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
mean

sd

Housing Variables
HPI (1990)
Supply Elasticity
Urban
Suburban
Rural

162.55
1.61
0.32
0.62
0.06

53.55
0.96
0.47
0.49
0.23

District Finance Data ($ 2015)
Total Expenditures
Teacher Salary Expenditures
Capital Expenditures
Property Tax Revenue
State Revenue
In a Reform State

11,728
6,305
1,127
4,294
5,871
0.60

4022
1928
1464
3426
2577
0.49

District Socio-Demographics
Frac. In Poverty
Frac. Black
Frac. Hispanic
Frac. White

0.13
0.15
0.17
0.61

0.09
0.19
0.21
0.29

1960
Frac.
Frac.
Frac.

0.09
0.04
0.10

0.05
0.05
0.09

Census Controls, County Level
In Poverty
Minority
Rural Population

District×Year Observations
Tract×Year Observations

2.2.2

184,825
405,550

Court Mandated School Finance Reforms

Our coding of the court mandated SFRs follows the list Jackson et al. (2015). As showing
in Table 2.2, the first court decision was the Serrano v. Priest decision in California, where
the Justice Sullivan, writing for the majority, ruled that the funding mechanism of public
education through local property taxes violated the equal protection clause of the state’s
constitution:
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”We are called upon to determine whether the California public school financing
system, with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant
wide disparities in school revenue, violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child’s
education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing as
we must that the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental
interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling
state purpose necessitating the present method of financing. We have concluded,
therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must
fall before the equal protection clause.” (Serrano v. Priest, 1971)
The first wave of challenges to school financing through local property taxes followed the
script of Serrano, ushering a wave of “equity reforms” which focused on equalizing funding
between school districts. As reported in Lafortune et al. (2018), the second wave of school
finance reforms, initiated by the Kentucky State Supreme Court decision in Rose vs. Council
for Better for Education (1989), was predicated on a constitutional right to the provision of
an adequate level of education for children in all parts of the state.

2.2.3

District Finance & Demographic Data

The school finance data are publicly available and come from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and includes total expenditures and revenues for individual school
districts each year. Along with the total expenditures and revenues, we can also observe
finer level data describing the source of revenue (federal, state, and local) along with the
channel of expenditures (teacher salaries, capital and construction expenses). In addition to
the annual data, we also use district level finance data from 1972 provided by the US Census Historical Database on Individual Government Finances to form the pre-reform spend
quartiles we use to identify heterogeneity in the effect of state reforms on per pupil spending.
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Table 2.2: List of SFRs by state and year that were mandated by state supreme courts.
We use GIS to match US census tracts to school district boundaries with shapefiles publicly available through IPUMS National Historical GIS shapefiles. At the tract level we
observe the house price index annually as a constant quality measure of average price appreciation. We balance the final panel by tracts where the price index is observed each year
from 1990 to 2015. The final panel consists of nearly 390,000 census-tract-by-year observations from 35 states and roughly 6,300 US school districts. Additional time varying data
describing student body race and poverty levels are included in the main specifications, along
with fixed county level descriptive variables from 1960 to control for pre-existing conditions
related to current levels of school spending as well as house prices.
Districts in our sample on average are majority white, with 13% of students living in
households at or below the poverty line (Table 2.1). Along with these time varying descriptors
we account for the fact that historical factors can influence the relationship between spending
and prices observed in recent periods. In our robustness tests we control for county level
measures of the poverty rate, minority share, and rural population share in 1960 under the
implication these measures would otherwise influence estimates of the main effect.
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2.3
2.3.1

Empirical Strategy
Background and Endogeneity Concerns

Because households sort across local jurisdictions and local taxation has historically played a
major role in the funding of K-12 schools in the United States, estimating the capitalization of
spending into property values has proven to be an especially challenging endeavor. Generally
speaking, school spending is highly correlated with local resources. This creates an obvious
endogeneity problem, as these resources are highly correlated with other local amenities,
which might impact local housing prices directly. Even more directly, the level of local
school spending is highly correlated with composition of the community itself, which also
might affect property values in any number of direct and indirect ways. Another generic
complication that arises in a world of primarily local school funding is that spending increases
are directly linked to increases in property taxes and other local sources of tax revenue. In
this way, we would expect property values to capitalize the total value of any bundled
spending and tax increases. This can severely negatively bias estimates of the value that
households place on the school spending itself.7
When financing moves to higher levels of government a host of additional endogeneity
issues arise. In general, because transfers from the state and federal government are often
explicitly tied to a district’s property tax base and other local economic conditions, state
and federal funding may be highly correlated with many factors that directly influence a
district’s property values.

2.3.2

School Finance Reform Event Study Design

Our empirical strategy relies on an event study design based on the timing of court-mandated
school finance reforms. As in Jackson et al. (2015), the key identifying assumption is that
7 We discuss the issue of local taxation and the related literature in local public finance in greater detail
later in this section.
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conditional on a state ever passing a school finance reform, the timing of the court order to
do so is as good as random.8 Our primary specification consists of an instrumental variables
regression of house prices on per pupil expenditures, using the school finance reform events
to construct instruments for per pupil expenditures. These instruments are based on a school
district’s initial quartile of the school expenditure distribution within its state crossed with
the time since the court ordered SFR. As shown in Figure 2.2, across all of the states that
instituted such reforms, spending increased steadily in districts in the lower versus higher
quartiles of the initial spending distribution in the two decades following a court-ordered
reform.
The primary goal of most SFRs was to reduce spending inequality between school districts with low per pupil expenditure and school districts with high per pupil expenditure.9
Following Jackson et al. (2015), we sort school districts in a state into per pupil expenditures
by quartile of per pupil expenditure in 1972.10 We also create event time dummies that run
from T = −20 to T = 20, where event time T = 0 corresponds to the time of the first courtmandated SFR.11 As in Jackson et al. (2015) our instrument for per pupil expenditure is
the event time dummies interacted with the 1972 spending quartiles. We also add in district
fixed effects and linear trends that vary with pre-reform characteristics.12 In this way, our
first stage regression specification is given by:


P P Ed,t = 

TX
=20 QX
72 =1



λQ,T 1(Q) × 1(T ) + fd + βXd,60 × t + d,t

T =−20 Q72 =4

where:
8 More

precisely, we require that the timing of a court-ordered SFR is as good as random after controlling
for pre-trends in school expenditure and other trend controls.
9 States use a wide variety of approaches including block grants, matching grants, and district power
equalizations, to accomplish this goal. See Murray et al. (1998), Hoxby (2001), and Card and Payne (2002)
for more a greater discussion of the impact of SFRs on expenditures and other outcomes.
10 Beginning in 1972, per-pupil expenditure at the school district level is continuously available nationwide
on an annual basis from the NCDB.
11 One could use subsequent reforms to serve as additional events as done in Lafortune, Rothstein and
Shanzenbach, but we following Jackson et al. (2015)’s design in this paper.
12 X
d,60 is a vector of 1960 county level measures of population, poverty rate, percent black, and percent
rural.
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• fd : district fixed effects
• Xd,60 × t: time trends in 1960 pre-reform characteristics
Figure 2.2 shows the predicted gap in spending between school districts in the bottom
three quartiles of pre-reform spending quartile relative to the quartile that initially had
the highest level of spending, conditional on district fixed effects and trends in pre-reform
characteristics, following the strategy in Jackson (2018).
From the perspective of our empirical event design strategy, an important feature of
Figure 2.2 is that there is essentially no difference in trends in school expenditures across
the four spending quartiles prior to a school finance reform. This supports the assumption
that the subsequent changes in school spending across the four quartiles in initial spending
are effectively shocks to school spending levels, uncorrelated with any prior trends in relative
spending levels.
After an SFR event, spending increases steadily in the lower pre-reform spending quartiles
relative to the top quartile, with school districts in the lowest quartile experiencing the largest
gains in expenditure. In fact, the increase in expenditure is monotonically increasing in how
low the pre-reform spending quartile is. In practice the lag in the full realization of the
reforms reflects the time it takes for the state legislatures to craft policy governing the new
school financing system following a court order, delays in full implementation of the reforms,
and the speed of other adjustments at the state and local levels to the new regime.
To estimate the impact of school spending on prices and other outcomes, like the fraction
of school children in poverty, we regress the outcome of interest on the fitted value of per
pupil school expenditure from our first stage instrument:13

Yd,t = θP Pˆ E d,t + βXd,60 × t + fd + d,t
13 All

of the preliminary results presented below are based on estimates of the IV regression in two steps.
We intend to use a one-step IV estimator in future drafts of the paper.
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Figure 2.1: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in the difference in per-pupil school
expenditures between school districts in the top 25 percentile of expenditures in 1972 and
school districts in the bottom 75 percentile of the expenditures in 1972 before and after
court-mandated school finance reforms.

2.3.3

SFR Event Study Design - Strengths and Challenges

Examining the impact of school finance reforms in this kind of broad event study design and
several potential complications that we examine carefully in the analysis that follows. A key
advantage of this approach is that it is possible to estimate school spending capitalization
in a broad national data set and to consider heterogeneity along a number of dimensions.
A second, more subtle advantage of this approach is that it allows us to break the link
between school spending and local taxation. Ideally, the school spending shocks shown in
Figure 2.2 would be completely orthogonal to changes in local taxes, allowing us to isolate
how households value the spending itself. As we explore in more detail in Section 2.5, it turns
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Figure 2.2: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in the difference in per-pupil school
expenditures between school districts in the top 25 percentile of expenditures in 1972 and
school districts in the bottom 75 percentile of the expenditures in 1972 before and after
court-mandated school finance reforms.
out that the school spending shocks shown in Figure 2.2 are in fact accompanied by some
changes in the level of local taxation. This is likely due to the fact that SFRs often changed
the incentives for local jurisdictions to raise money from local sources, often subsidizing such
efforts in low spending districts and implicitly taxing such efforts in high spending districts.
To deal with any the impact of SFRs on local tax levels, we estimate a broader version of
our main specification in Section 2.5. In particular, we estimate a specification that includes
both per pupil school spending and per pupil local tax revenues, instrumenting for both with
the SFR shocks. Using the same notation as above, this consists of estimating a second first
stage for local tax revenues (PPLTR) and including those fitted values along with the ones
for per pupil school spending in the second stage.
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P P LT Rd,t = 

TX
=20 QX
72 =1



λQ,T 1(Q) × 1(T ) + fd + βXd,60 × t + d,t

T =−20 Q72 =4

ˆ Rd,t + βXd,60 × t + fd + d,t
Yd,t = θP Pˆ E d,t + θP P LT
As we discuss in Section 2.5, because extent and timing of local tax changes following
SFRs varies substantially from the school spending changes, we are able to separately identify
the effect of spending and taxes in this extended model. Moreover, each of the event-time
dummies is an instrumental variable, which gives us formally N × Q instrumental variables
for estimating a model with two endogenous regressors – per pupil spending and per pupil
tax revenues. In principle we are over-identified.

2.4
2.4.1

Main Results
House Price Capitalization

We begin our analysis of the effect of school spending on house prices by creating an event
study figure for house prices analogous to the one for school spending shown in Figure 2.2.
Specifically, Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics of log house prices by initial school spending
quartile (Q1-Q4) for three years before and twenty years after a school finance reform. As
the figure makes clear, house prices rose sharply in Q1-Q3 districts relative to highest quartile
(Q4) districts, following the same general pattern as the impact of SFRs on school spending.
Table 2.3 shows the impact of school spending on housing prices overall and across various
geographies. The first column reports the results of a regression of the log house price
index on predicted log school spending, where predicted log school spending is based on the
variation across school districts for twenty years following a school finance reform, as shown
in Figure 2.2.14 All specifications also include census tract fixed effects and calendar year
14 The

first stage regression also includes four years of pre-reform trends by school spending quartile in
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Figure 2.3: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in FHFA House Price Index before
and after court-mandated school finance reforms. The three series represent differences in
the log of the house price index between the top 25 percentile of school spending districts
and the bottom 75 percent of school spending districts before and after the reforms. New
York is excluded due to strong pre-trends associated with the mid-2000s housing boom and
bust.
dummies.
The results imply a substantial impact of school spending on house prices, a 1 percent
increase in school spending leads to a 0.8 percent increase in property values. This sharp
increase in the willingness to pay for access to better funded schools implies that households
observe and value increases in school spending as an investment in their children. The
magnitude of the estimated impact of school spending on property values is also consistent
with the substantial effects on children’s life outcomes documented in Jackson et al. (2015)
1990.
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Log(PPE)
Log(PPE)
Log(PPE)
Log(PPE)
Log(PPE)

House Price Capitalization of Per Pupil School Expenditures
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.772** 0.861** 1.539*** 1.409***
(0.330) (0.369)
(0.524)
(0.460)
× Supply Elasticity
-0.339*** -0.330***
(0.0994)
(0.0698)
× Urban
1.115***
(0.358)
× Suburban
0.869**
(0.338)
× Rural
0.600*
(0.349)

Observations
R-squared
Number of tracts
District FE
Calendar Year FE
Census Controls

425,456 390,142 359,900
329,744
0.793
0.801
0.804
0.809
16,394 15,015
13,872
12,692
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

425,456
0.797
16,394
YES
YES
NO

(6)

1.090***
(0.375)
0.899**
(0.368)
0.756*
(0.385)
390,142
0.803
15,015
YES
YES
YES

Table 2.3: House prices on spending instrument, w. and w.out 1960 Census controls; UrbanSuburban-Rural; Housing Elasticity interaction
and Lafortune et al. (2018).
The second column of Table 2.3 controls for time trends interacted with 1960 Census
levels of log population, poverty rate, the fraction of non-white residents, and the fraction
of residents in rural/non-farm areas, measured at the county level.15 The coefficient on predicted school spending changes only slightly with the inclusion of these controls, suggesting
that these results are not at all sensitive to differential time trends across school districts.
The specifications reported in the middle columns of Table 2.3 identify the impact of
school spending on house values separately for urban, suburban, and rural geographies. The
point estimates are largest in urban and suburban areas and slightly smaller in rural areas,
although the estimates are large and statistically significant everywhere and not statistically
different from one another.
15 These

are the same controls used in Jackson et al. (2015).
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The final two columns of Table 2.3 examine how the estimated impact of school spending
on property values varies with housing supply elasticity. In general, we expect increases in
local amenities to lead to smaller price changes in regions with more elastic housing supply, as
increases in the subsequent housing stock dampen the price effect. This is, in fact, exactly,
what the results reveal, implying a much larger degree of price capitalization in inelastic
housing supply regions. For example, the implied coefficient in a market with an elasticity of
0.5 (San Francisco) is about 1.1, while the implied coefficient in a market with an elasticity of
2.5 (Dallas) is only 0.4. In this way, the exact degree of capitalization of school spending into
housing prices is quite dependent on urban housing market conditions, exactly as economic
theory would predict.

2.4.2

House Price Capitalization and Poverty

The sharp increase in housing prices following an increase in school spending naturally affects
who can afford to live in a school district. Moreover, the changes in school spending might
affect sorting on the basis of willingness to pay. Thus, as a natural extension of our main
capitalization results, we now investigate the impact of school spending levels on the fraction
of children in poverty in a school district.
Figure 2.4 shows how the fraction of children in poverty within a district changes following
a school finance reform. As the figure makes clear, the fraction of children in poverty declines
steadily, especially in Q1 relative to Q4 districts, again very much in line with the dynamics
of school spending changes.
Table 2.4 follows the same general format as Table 2.3 above, showing the impact of
school spending on the fraction of children in poverty, with and without 1960 Census controls
interacted with a linear time trend, and across various geographies. The results reported in
the first two columns imply that the fraction of children in poverty declines by about 0.2
percentage points following a 1 percent increase in school spending. The middle two columns
interact school spending with geography, again revealing statistically significant and similar
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Effect of School Expenditures on School District Poverty Rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Log(PPE)
-0.150*** -0.144*** -0.250*** -0.212***
(0.0254)
(0.0174)
(0.0710)
(0.0417)
Log(PPE) × Supply Elasticity
0.0502** 0.0430***
(0.0217)
(0.0125)
Log(PPE) × Urban
-0.226*** -0.201***
(0.0649)
(0.0415)
Log(PPE) × Suburban
-0.147*** -0.141***
(0.0270)
(0.0220)
Log(PPE) × Rural
-0.158*** -0.150***
(0.0258)
(0.0238)
Observations
376,255
345,083
318,271
291,659
376,255
345,083
R-squared
0.372
0.399
0.415
0.439
0.387
0.406
Number of tract
16,394
15,015
13,872
12,692
16,394
15,015
District FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Calendar Year FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Census Controls
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Percent Poverty on spending instrument, w. and w.out 1960 Census controls;
Urban-Suburban-Rural; Housing Elasticity interaction (6 columns)
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Figure 2.4: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in fraction of poor students in
school districts before and after court-mandated school finance reforms. The three series
represent differences in the fraction of poor students between the top 25 percentile of school
spending districts and the bottom 75 percent of school spending districts before and after
the reforms.
effect sizes in urban, suburban, and rural districts, with slightly larger point estimates in
urban areas. The final two columns of Table 2.4 include interactions with housing supply
elasticity. Consistent with the house price effects in Table 2.4, the impact of changes in school
spending on the fraction of children in poverty is largest in regions with more inelastic vs.
elastic housing supply, in other words, exactly where the impact on the cost of housing is
greatest.
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Conditional House Price Capitalization of Per Pupil Expenditures
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Log(Per Pupil Expenditure) 0.861** 0.710** 1.409*** 1.113***
(0.369) (0.350)
(0.460)
(0.328)
Log(PPE) × Supply Elast.
-0.330*** -0.273***
(0.0698)
(0.0660)
Log(PPE) × Urban
1.090***
(0.375)
Log(PPE) × Suburban
0.899**
(0.368)
Log(PPE) × Rural
0.756*
(0.385)
Observations
390,142 343,479 329,744
290,606
390,142
R-squared
0.801
0.817
0.809
0.818
0.803
Number of tract
15,015 15,015
12,692
12,692
15,015
District FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Calendar Year FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Census Controls
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
District Demographics
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(6)

0.774**
(0.334)
0.766**
(0.345)
0.538
(0.355)
343,479
0.818
15,015
YES
YES
YES
YES

Table 2.5: House prices on spending instrument, w. 1960 Census trend controls, w. and
w.out school demographic controls (race and poverty); Note: just report spending results (6
columns)

2.4.3

The Direct vs. Indirect Capitalization of School Spending

That exogenous increases in school spending decrease the fraction of children in poverty
within a district suggests that the house price effects documented above may combine a direct
effect of school spending and an indirect effect that results from the changing demographic
and socioeconomic composition of the school district. To separate these components, Table
2.5 repeats the earlier house price specifications reported in Table 2.3 with additional controls
for the fraction of children in poverty and the racial and ethnic composition of the school
district.
The results reported in Table 2.5 reveal a remarkably consistent pattern, with the inclusion of controls for demographic and socioeconomic composition reducing the estimated
direct effect of school spending on house prices by about 20 percent in each specification.
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In this way, the vast majority – about 80 percent – of the overall capitalization of school
spending into house prices is a direct effect of the spending, while 20 percent is due to the
sorting that occurs following the spending change.

2.5

Taxes and Spending

A longstanding challenge in the empirical literature on the capitalization of school spending
is the natural coupling of changes in spending and taxation. When all taxes and spending
are local, for example, any increase in school spending must be accompanied 1-for-1 with
an increase in local taxes. In such a setting, it would not be surprising for price regressions
like those estimated above to reveal a very small willingness to pay for increases in school
spending, as the estimates would instead be capturing the combined effect of the spending
and tax changes. In fact, a strong prediction of the theoretical local public finance literature following Tiebout is that the effect of a marginal change in school spending (with the
accompanied increase in local taxes) should be exactly zero in equilibrium.
Even in settings in which a portion of tax revenues comes from higher levels of government
- so that school spending and local taxes are not perfectly collinear – funding from the
state and federal level is typically explicitly tied to the local tax base and other economic
conditions. The resulting endogeneity problems have traditionally made it very difficult to
isolate the causal effect of school spending changes on house prices.
An attractive feature of using the SFR event study design is that SFRs often increase
revenue to previously low-spending districts from multiple levels of government. In addition
to some direct redistribution at the state level, certain kinds of SFRs, in particular, like
district power equalization formulas and matching grants, create incentives for districts with
relatively poor local tax bases to increase local tax revenue and, often, for high spending
districts to decrease local tax revenue (Hoxby 2001; Hoxby and Kuziemko 2004).
Figure 2.6 shows the dynamics of local tax revenues following a school finance reform,
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separating districts again into quartiles (Q1-Q4) based on initial school spending in 1972. As
the figure makes clear, local property tax revenue increased in districts with relatively low vs.
high initial levels of spending, but the timing and extent of the changes vary substantially
across spending quartiles. In particular, non-local sources of revenue increased primarily in
Q1 districts relative the other quartiles and, primarily, in one level shift upwards in years 4-7
following the reform. Local tax revenue, on the other hand, increased more gradually and
in the line with initial school spending levels, increasing the most for Q1 and moderately
for Q2 and Q3 relative to Q4 districts. This variation in the timing and extent of the
changes across school spending quartiles provides the basis for separately identifying the
capitalization school spending and local tax revenues.
To separately identify the role of spending and taxes on local housing prices, Table 2.6
presents the results from a series of specifications that add the log of local tax revenues to
the specifications reported in Table 2.3 above. In this case, we instrument for both log school
spending and log local tax revenue using the school finance reform event study design.
As expected, local tax revenue enters negatively in all of the specifications and across
all geographies. Importantly, the inclusion of local property tax revenue has only a modest
impact on the coefficients on school spending in all six specifications, when compared to the
analogous result presented in Table 2.3. That the coefficients on school spending change
so little suggests that there is only a modest amount of high frequency correlation between
local and non-local tax revenue sources within the event study framework.
A comparison of the size of the coefficients on log local tax revenue and log school
spending provides an assessment of the efficiency of school spending. This is an especially
attractive feature of the SFR event study design, which allows us to separately identify how
both spending and taxation are capitalized into house prices within a single national study.
To assess the efficiency of school spending, we need to compare the value of a dollar in
local taxes versus school spending. For our sample as a whole, local tax revenue represents
about 35 percent of school spending. So, in dollar terms, a 1.0 percent increase in local

74

House Price Capitalization of Per Pupil School Expenditures & Taxes
1
2
3
4
5
Log(Per Pupil Expenditures)

0.700**
(0.327)

0.777**
(0.364)

Log(PPE) × Supply Elasticity
Log(Per Pupil Tax Revenues)

-0.150** -0.166*
(0.0707) (0.0844)

Log(PPTR) × Supply Elasticity

1.600***
(0.498)
-0.387***
(0.115)
-0.131
(0.194)
0.0578
(0.0916)

6

1.477***
(0.476)
-0.380***
(0.0982)
-0.190
(0.215)
0.0653
(0.0795)

Log(PPE) × Urban
Log(PPE) × Suburban
Log(PPE) × Rural
Log(PPTR) × Urban
Log(PPTR) × Suburban
Log(PPTR) × Rural

0.952**
(0.357)
0.828**
(0.335)
0.603
(0.370)
-0.0450
(0.147)
-0.210***
(0.0626)
-0.248
(0.151)

0.925**
(0.377)
0.830**
(0.367)
0.691*
(0.383)
-0.0739
(0.161)
-0.214***
(0.0713)
-0.206
(0.154)

0.239
(0.145)
0.0364
(0.105)
-0.0672
(0.160)

0.186
(0.163)
0.0216
(0.118)
0.0008
(0.175)

425,456
0.798
16,394
YES
YES
NO

390,142
0.804
15,015
YES
YES
YES

Resulting % ↑ House Price from ↑ PPE funded by a 1% ↑ in PPTR
All Areas

0.0596
(0.117)

0.0566
(0.129)

Urban Areas (%)
Suburban Areas (%)
Rural Areas (%)

Observations
R-squared
Number of tract
District FE
Calendar Year FE
Census Controls

425,456 390,142
359,900
329,744
0.793
0.802
0.805
0.810
16,394
15,015
13,872
12,692
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.6: House prices on spending and local tax instrument, w. and w.out 1960 Census
controls; Urban-Suburban-Rural; Housing Elasticity interaction (6 columns)
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Figure 2.5: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in log local tax revenue in school
districts before and after court-mandated school finance reforms. The three series represent
differences in the fraction of poor students between the top 25 percentile of school spending
districts and the bottom 75 percent of school spending districts before and after the reforms.
tax revenues is equivalent to only about a 0.35 percent increase in school spending. In the
lower panel of Table 2.6 we perform this calculation to assess the percent change in house
prices that would result from an increase in spending that is financed by a 1% increase in
taxes. Overall, we find a positive but statistically insignificant effect of 0.06% both with and
without the 1960 census controls. Since this effect is also economically small, the evidence
suggests that education spending overall is approximately efficient, if not slightly underfunded. When we break out our results by geography, the effect sizes are even smaller for
urban (0.02%) and rural areas (0.008%) and closer to zero, which suggests efficiency. While
the change in house prices is statistically insignificant across all geographies, the effect size
is an order of magnitude larger in urban areas (0.19%) when compared to either rural or
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Figure 2.6: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in log local tax revenue in school
districts before and after court-mandated school finance reforms for the period 1990-2015.
The three series represent differences in the fraction of poor students between the top 25
percentile of school spending districts and the bottom 75 percent of school spending districts
before and after the reforms.
suburban areas. This suggests that if education is under-funded anywhere, it is most likely
to be underfunded in urban areas.

2.6

Which Kinds of Spending Matter?

The results of the previous two sections make clear that households highly value the changes
in school spending resulting from school finance reform shocks however the money is spent
in practice. A natural next question, then, is: does it matter how the money is spent?
To address this question, we utilize the spending categories available in the Common Core
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Data to separate spending into a component that capture the total salaries of all personnel
in the district and a component that captures all other non-salary spending. Figures 2.7 and
2.8 shows how the log of these two spending components changes following a school finance
reform. There is, once again, substantial variation the timing and extent of the changes
across the four spending quartiles.

Figure 2.7: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in log salary expenditures in school
districts before and after court-mandated school finance reforms for the period 1990-2015.
The three series represent differences in the fraction of poor students between the top 25
percentile of school spending districts and the bottom 75 percent of school spending districts
before and after the reforms.
Using this variation, Table 2.7 reports results for a series of log house price regressions
analogous to those reported in Table 2.3 but with spending broken down into per pupil
salary and non-salary components. The results reveal that households highly value spending
on salaries. The coefficients on salary spending are large and statistically significant in all
geographies. The coefficients on non-salary spending, on the other hand, are negative and
statistically indistinguishable from zero in every specification in Table 2.7.
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Figure 2.8: Event-study graph demonstrating the change in log non-salary expenditures in
school districts before and after court-mandated school finance reforms for the period 19902015. The three series represent differences in the fraction of poor students between the
top 25 percentile of school spending districts and the bottom 75 percent of school spending
districts before and after the reforms.
That spending on salaries is so highly valued by households suggests that households
observe and appreciate the increase in either the number of positions funded, which might
reduce class sizes, or the average salary per position, which might improve teacher quality. It
also belies the notion that higher spending on personnel would largely lead to infra-marginal
windfalls for existing teachers and staff with no resulting benefits to children.
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House Price Capitalization of Salary and Non-Salary Expenditures
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Log(Salaries)
1.892*** 2.216*** 2.109*** 2.083***
(0.476)
(0.509)
(0.595)
(0.681)
Log(Non-Salary Spending)
-0.820* -0.756**
-0.430
-0.376
(0.429)
(0.356)
(0.359)
(0.299)
Log(Sal.) × Supply Elast.
-0.175
-0.110
(0.123)
(0.138)
Log(Non-Sal.) × Supply Elast.
-0.140
-0.153*
(0.0987) (0.0868)
Log(Sal.) × Urban
1.875*** 2.085***
(0.534)
(0.566)
Log(Sal.) × Suburban
1.942*** 2.274***
(0.471)
(0.509)
Log(Sal.) × Rural
1.885*** 2.348***
(0.503)
(0.551)
Log(Non-Sal.) × Urban
-0.591
-0.574
(0.383)
(0.353)
Log(Non-Sal.) × Suburban
-0.762* -0.751**
(0.404)
(0.349)
Log(Non-Sal.) × Rural
-0.900** -0.854**
(0.414)
(0.346)
Observations
425,456 390,142 359,900 329,744 425,456 390,142
R-squared
0.803
0.813
0.814
0.819
0.807
0.815
Number of tract
16,394
15,015
13,872
12,692
16,394
15,015
District FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Calendar Year FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Census Controls
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: House prices on salary and non-salary spending, with and without 1960 Census
controls; Urban-Suburban-Rural; Housing Elasticity interaction (6 columns)
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2.7

Conclusion

This paper uses variation in school spending and local taxation resulting from court-ordered
school finance reforms to provide new empirical evidence on several of the longest standing
questions in local public finance and the economics of education. In addition to providing
independent variation in school spending and local taxation, a key advantage of the SFR
event study design that we employ is that the resulting estimates are based on a national
sample of school districts rather than a single metropolitan area.
We begin our study by taking up the question of whether exogenous increases in school
spending are capitalized into house values. While the answer to this question may seem
obvious, a strand of the literature since Hanushek (1986) has argued that the value of school
spending on the margin is close to zero. We instead find strong evidence that an exogenous increase in school spending is sharply capitalized into housing prices, implying that
households place a high value on marginal school spending. This result is in line with the
substantial benefits of school spending on the lifetime outcomes of children estimated in
Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2015). We also find that the combination of higher house
prices and increased school spending affects who sorts into a school district, decreasing the
fraction of children in poverty. The vast majority of school spending capitalization, however,
is due to the direct effect of school spending rather than any indirect effect related to sorting.
We next take up the question of whether school spending is efficient. Since Oates (1969),
economists have argued that if local public goods are provided efficiently, a marginal dollar
raised through local taxes and spent on local public goods should have no effect on house
values. While this implication is theoretically straightforward, testing it empirically has
proven difficult, as local tax and spending levels are often highly co-linear and correlated
with local the socioeconomic composition of the district and/or local economic conditions.
To address this question, we take advantage of the fact that court ordered SFRs resulted in
changes in school spending through multiple channels, both increasing redistribution at the
state level and changing incentives to raise revenue at the local level. Our results indicate
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that the total impact of a local dollar raised for school spending is close to zero, implying that
school spending is efficient on average nationwide. While not quite statistically significant,
the marginal value of a dollar of school spending raised from local taxation is positive in
urban areas, suggesting that spending is inefficiently low in urban districts in contrast to
suburban and rural ones.
We close the paper by investigating what forms of school spending households value.
Strikingly, house prices are sharply increasing in spending on salaries and actually slightly
decreasing in other forms of spending. This implies that parents value either the increased
quality or quantity of school personnel made possible by higher spending on salaries, something we are exploring further in ongoing work.
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Chapter 3
Affordable Housing Development and
The Provision of Local Public Schools
3.1

Introduction

I explore the effects of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program on US public
schools. As a large national housing program, it is important to understand the interaction of
this program with public goods provided locally. This paper is a descriptive analysis focused
on two margins of interest. The first is understanding how new housing development under
the LIHTC program affects the size of schools and districts. The second dimension of interest
is the effect of LIHTC on district resources, or expenditures per-pupil. I frame this analysis
around the broader implications of housing policy spillovers into schools and neighborhoods.
I conduct two preliminary statistical tests in this paper. The first is an event-study
analysis in which I show visually that enrollment increases nearly 5% in the school years
following LIHTC development. Further, my results show that LIHTC targeted towards
families increases nearby school enrollment in a way that can be distinguished from other
types of LIHTC development.I then use OLS to test how LIHTC development affects district
level school financing. My results suggest that LIHTC development can be associated with
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higher district student counts and lower levels of per-pupil spending. The OLS results imply
that a net positive flow of students into the district following LIHTC development, which
potentially decreases the per-pupil spending levels. The future of this paper will employ a
more robust analysis to identify the causal link studied descriptively here.

3.2

Data

The LIHTC data come from HUD and describe the year the units are available for rent,
the number of units put in service, if the units are designated for families, and the physical
location of the LIHTC complex which I use to map the units to school zones and districts.
Roughly 33% of the LIHTC activity in my sample is development targeted towards families,
which I argue will have a differential effect on schools than other development. I observe
3,600 schools in 1,533 US school districts, and roughly 25% of schools in my sample have
had LIHTC from 2000-2015 within school boundaries. For a full description of the LIHTC
data, please see section 4.1 of the first dissertation chapter. For a complete description of
the school finance data, please see section 2.3 of the second dissertation chapter.

3.3

Empirical Analysis

My first empirical goal is to estimate how LIHTC development within an attendance boundary will affect enrollment. Given the panel nature of my data, I employ a two-way eventstudy regression and plot coefficents that relate the timing of LIHTC to changes in school
enrollment. Consider a middle school i in year t. My model takes the form

Enrollit = αEnrollit−1 +

2 X
15
X

(Iig × Dik )πgk + θi + θt + ξit ,

(3.1)

g =1 k =−6

where θi and θt are school and year fixed effects, respectively. By including a one-year
lagged enrollment as an explanatory variable along with the fixed effects, my goal is to
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absorb variation in enrollment unrelated to the timing of new LIHTC development. Thus
my event-time coefficients πgk trace out the estimated effect of LIHTC on school enrollment,
categorized by family targeted development status. I plot the estimated effect on enrollment
in figure 22.

Figure 3.1: Event-study estimates of the school enrollment response to LIHTC. 3-5 years following LIHTC, enrollment has increased roughly 4%.Data includes 3,661 US middle schools
from 2000-2015.
The plot in figure 22 highlights how family targeted LIHTC deferentially increases school
enrollment. By design, the estimates show enrollment changes in schools near LIHTC relative
to schools in the same year that had not been exposed to any development at all. Roughly
2-5 years following new units becoming available for rent, family targeted LIHTC increases
enrollment by 3-4%. The model does not predict LIHTC relative increases in enrollment
near LIHTC without the family designation.
A similar test for the effect of LIHTC on teacher counts is the first step in understanding
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how resources are reallocated following development. I estimate equation 17 instead using
teacher counts as the outcome variable and lagged explanatory variable. Figure 23 shows that
teacher counts, specifically measured as full-time equivalent teaching personnel, increase in a
similar way as enrollment near family specific LIHTC. Again, the notable difference between
the effect of family targeted development and all other LIHTC is striking.

Figure 3.2: Event-study estimates of the school enrollment response to LIHTC. Increased
teacher counts following LIHTC suggest the housing program requires reallocation of school
district resources. Data includes 3,661 US middle schools from 2000-2015.
Figure 22 suggests that LIHTC incentives to provide affordable housing to families with
children works to increase the enrollment of schools nearby. Teacher counts in figure 23
show an increase, possibly suggesting administrative attempts to keep class size constant as
enrollment rises. Two questions are motivated from the school level findings that are step
towards understanding how LIHTC affects the administrative provision of schooling. What
is the net effect of LIHTC on district enrollment? If resource planning occurs the district
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level, there are different implications for planners if the school enrollment changes following
LIHTC on average represent students moving from different schools in the same district or
new students from schools in a separate district. Further, does district spending per-pupil
change as a result of new LIHTC development?
I test for district-level effects of LIHTC using difference-in-differences estimation. I categorize schools in the treated group as those that received family targeted LIHTC, with the
control group consisting of those schools receiving LIHTC with no family specific designation
and those receiving no LIHTC at all. The identifying assumption follows from the preliminary evidence in figure 22. If all else is constant across LIHTC development on average except
for the family designation, then I can estimate the net effect of family designated LIHTC
on both district enrollment and district financing. For a school district j, my specification
takes the form

Yjt = γ1 I (P ost = 1) + γ2 I (P ost = 1) × I (F amily = 1) + δYjt−1 + θj + θt + ξjt ,

(3.2)

where I (P ost = 1) is an indicator for districts following any LIHTC, and I (F amily = 1) is
an indicator for family targeted LIHTC. The effect of interest is represented by γ1 and γ2 . I
also include a one-period lag of the outcome variable to capture the time-varying inertia of
district level outcomes, along with year and district fixed effects θt and θj .
The working hypothesis of this paper is that the district allocation of resources will
respond to the arrival of family targeted LIHTC. I first test equation 18 for the effect on
district enrollment. The idea is that the enrollment regressions will identify the net effect
of LIHTC on district enrollment, or the difference between new students arriving and those
leaving the district in a given year. One consideration is that students can be part of
households that sort into the district when LIHTC arrives, but not as LIHTC residents. I
estimate the average effect assumed constant across all LIHTC types as γ1 . Thus γ1 + γ2
represents the overall treatment effect for family targeted LIHTC on enrollment. I present
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the results of this regression in table 1.
Column 1 contains the baseline results while column 2 includes robust interactions for
urban and suburban districts, along with the lag enrollment as a control in column 3. Column
2 suggests that the introduction of family targeted LIHTC has the largest enrollment effects
in metropolitan areas (urban and suburban districts) as opposed to similar development near
schools in smaller towns and rural areas. The results in column two suggests metropolitan
area district enrollment will increase 4% to 6% depending on proximity to the city core.
Table 3.1: The Effect of LIHTC on District Enrollment
(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

(3)
OLS

I (P ost = 1)

0.0323∗∗
(0.0113)

0.0327∗∗
(0.0113)

0.00572∗∗∗
(0.00124)

I (P ost = 1) × I (F amily = 1)

-0.0177
(0.0130)

-0.0376∗∗
(0.0130)

-0.00392∗∗
(0.00149)

I (P ost = 1) × I (F amily = 1) × I (U rban = 1)

0.0439∗∗∗
(0.0129)

-0.00154
(0.00127)

I (P ost = 1) × I (F amily = 1) × I (Suburban = 1)

0.0657∗∗∗
(0.0112)

-0.00191
(0.00129)
0.920∗∗∗
(0.0149)

Log (Enrollmentt−1 )
Districts
r2

1,533
0.992

1,533
0.992

1,533
0.999

Standard errors in parentheses. All models include district and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

I estimate equation 18 next using per-pupil spending as an outcome. The idea is that perpupil spending represents the level of district resources allocated to each student. Figure 23
shows at the school level, teacher counts increase following family targeted LIHTC. Further,
table 1 shows that LIHTC is associated with a net increase in district enrollment. An
empirical question is if districts must spend more following these enrollment increases or if
total spending is fixed and resources are reallocated. The former is a question of the budget
constraint, while the latter is a question of input mix. The results of the spending regression
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are presented in table 2.
Table 3.2: The Effect of LIHTC on District Spending
(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

(3)
OLS

I (P ost = 1)

-0.0150∗
(0.00660)

-0.0150∗ -0.00925∗∗
(0.00660) (0.00294)

I (P ost = 1) × I (F amily = 1)

-0.00346
(0.00655)

-0.00392
(0.00672)

-0.00261
(0.00372)

I (P ost = 1) × I (F amily = 1) × I (U rban = 1)

0.00107
(0.00779)

0.00400
(0.00477)

I (P ost = 1) × I (F amily = 1) × I (Suburban = 1)

0.00237
(0.00674)

0.00805
(0.00423)
0.592∗∗∗
(0.0163)

Log (Spendt−1 )
Districts
r2

1,533
0.791

1,533
0.791

1,533
0.858

Standard errors in parentheses. All models include district and year fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

The results presented in row 1 of table 2 suggest that per-pupil spending decreases at
the district level following LIHTC development. The heterogeneity results by metropolitan
locale are not statistically significant. Although I do not apply causal interpretation to these
results, there appears to be a negative conditional correlation between LIHTC development
and per-pupil spending. In the context of the prior results this suggests a stickiness to total
district budgets that causes per-pupil spending to fall following increases in enrollment.

3.4

Conclusion

The goal of this descriptive analysis is to highlight family targeted development as a channel
where the largest spillovers from LIHTC into schools are present. As motivation, eventstudy regressions show that schools near family LIHTC experience enrollment increases and
respond by increasing teacher counts. I expand the analysis to the district level under the
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assumption that district planners have some control over the allocation of resources across
schools. Two testable implications arise from the increases in enrollment and teacher counts
at the school level. I first show that on net, district enrollment also increases which provides
some evidence to reject the hypothesis that new students at a school following LIHTC come
from within the district. I then show that district spending per-pupil decreases following
LIHTC, which suggests that district budgets could be considered inelastic with respect to
enrollment counts.
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